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Abstract 
This is an analysis of two moments in the Colombian history within a century 
of difference, where isolation, accumulation and violence interact in a region 
brought into the worlds’ imaginary by the Colombian novelist Gabriel García 
Márquez in One Hundred years of Solitude.  
A valley between four natural borderlines: the Sierra Nevada of Santa 
Marta, the Perijá hills, the Central and East ‘Cordilleras’ -mountain range- and 
the Magdalena River in the departments of Cesar and Magdalena (Colombia) 
part of what was called the department of ‘Magdalena Grande’ was blessed – 
or perhaps coursed – with wealth in natural resources; plenty of water streams, 
a unique biodiversity, cultural affluence and immense reserves of one of the 
purest steam coals.  
This paper attempts to draw a picture of the superimposed and persistent 
power structures that apparently facilitate the accumulative processes and 
imbalances within one century of difference, making use of violence as means 
to maintain equilibrium. Environment is changed trough politicized violent 
inflictions over society and nature. The resultant scars are the ones inflicted on 
a collective memory, as this valley is and will always be recalled by the poetic 
truth of the narrative of Gabriel García Marquez who recreated this mythic 
environment as ‘Macondo’. He remembers his own story of early childhood 
that here serves as an excuse to analyze a region that is again being bled by 
accumulation. 
Keywords 
Coal, banana, extraction enclaves, isolation, accumulation, violence, political 
ecology of violence, Colombia. 
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One hundred years of solitude, accumulation and 
violence 
A comparative historical analysis of the Sierra Nevada of 
Santa Marta Valley 
1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the social relations of production and social 
fields of power (Peluso & Watts, 2001) that have led to isolation, accumulation 
and violence in a region traditionally rich in natural resources. A comparative 
historical analysis is pursued, taking two deep cross-cuts in history: one each at 
the beginnings of the 20th and the 21st centuries. 
The implications of the politicized relations generated at these two specific 
moments by two multinational companies, United Fruit Company (UFC) and 
Drummond Ltd., will be assessed. This document analyzes their incidence on 
society and the consequent transformations of nature performed during their 
productive processes, by responding to the query of how violence is 
interrelated with accumulation and if violence is cause or effect of the 
accumulation that was performed in two different moments in time. 
1.1 Historical perspective 
The Valley of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta was for centuries considered a 
wild territory, a source of natural raw materials and cheap wage labour. It is an 
immense basin surrounded by four natural borders, which kept it isolated from 
the central territories for almost four centuries. Yet at the same time the 
extraordinary characteristics of its bay--where in 1525 the city of Santa Marta 
was founded and where this valley touches the sea--favoured the development 
of one of the first and most important Spanish output ports, from which raw 
materials and precious metals from all over Latin America were sent to 
Europe. The port was established for its easy access, shorter distance to Spain, 
natural anchorage for ships and long distance view of the Snow Mountains of 
the Sierra Nevada (White, 1978). 
Nevertheless these same characteristics made the port vulnerable to 
continuous attacks, like the one by the pirate Drake in 1596 and by the Dutch 
in 1629  (White, 1978), which led to the destruction of the city and caused the 
region to be semi-abandoned and kept in oblivion until the beginning of the 
20th century. It was during this time that the region regained importance with 
the establishment of the UFC and the banana export industry in 1900 
(LeGrand, 1984). From this time on, what was later called by academics and 
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researchers an ‘Extraction Enclave’ (Enclave Extractivo)1 was created, which 
favoured patterns of accumulation and imbalance in the region for more than a 
century. 
Typically one could speak of ‘external groups’ in a region which configure the 
accumulative processes. In that, multinationals as well as national companies, or 
elites that settle in an area without becoming part of it can take a leading role 
(Archila, et al., 2012, p. 22). 
One century after the establishment of the ‘Banana Enclave’ by the UFC the 
same ‘accumulative’ patterns continue to be present in the region (Harvey, 
1982). A different multinational company is at the forefront of the current 
‘Extraction Enclave’ in the valley: the coal mining transnational Drummond 
Ltd., which settled further into the valley to this time establish an Enclave for 
steam coal export. 
Since the end of the 19th Century, Latin American countries, including the 
one this paper analyzes, have been moulded by patterns in the world’s 
economy. Liberalism and later Neo-liberalism were followed by the Colombian 
and many other governments with no regard for the good or bad results for 
the development of the country and regions or the sustainability of their 
natural resources. ‘Extraction Enclaves’ (banana, petroleum, gold, palm oil) 
were favoured as response to the struggles of the central government to 
develop and integrate a ‘savage territory’. Nevertheless, the result is visible after 
one hundred years: isolation, pollution and misery. 
Dynamics assumed by governments generally favoured the establishment 
of ‘Extraction Enclaves’ in different countries in Latin America like Ecuador, 
Costa Rica, Honduras or Jamaica. The enclaves brought relevance to the 
regions at a national and global level. Colombia, like other countries, kept these 
regions under patterns of isolation that set them apart from the benefits of 
national infrastructure, institutionalism and culture. Economic favouritism 
maintained such regions isolated from the rest of the nations. In the region 
analyzed here it created differential interactions at political, cultural, and social 
levels that facilitated the presence of civil and armed official powers, which 
helped perpetuate the accumulative patterns in the productive model through 
the use of violence (Archila, et al., 2012). The class differences grew stronger, 
and the imbalances and implications of power dynamics favoured aggressive 
responses to and from the deprived groups, configuring the particular 
interaction dynamic assessed herein. 
It is important to emphasize that this Research Paper does not concentrate 
on a conflict perspective or a human rights approach of the ongoing war in 
Colombia, which has certainly influenced the dynamics of social relations in 
                                                
1 To understand the concept of ‘extraction enclave’ I make use of the definition that 
speaks about intensive exploitation of natural resources (mineral or agricultural) in a 
territory of importance for the national and global economy, that barely articulates 
with the nation, and where the presence of the state would mean more intensity in the 
presence of official forces and less visibility of the institutions that regulate the 
development of society (Archila et al. 2012, p.21-22). 
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production and social fields of power in many regions. This assessment does 
not focus either on the analysis of rural politics and their implications on the 
productive enclaves implied in the research, although these to some extent 
have to be included in the frame of analysis. 
Instead, it makes use of the Political Ecology of Violence and Uneven 
Geographies theories to understand existing social, political and economic 
production relations and how they interrelate with violence in a particular 
region of Colombia in two specific moments in time. The research is based on 
an analysis of how society interacts with natural resources and how the 
accumulative processes intermingle with imbalances that are structured upon, 
and structuring of, violent behaviours.  
Dummont, quoted by Michael Watts in his assessment of Petro-Violence 
in Nigeria and Ecuador (2001), said in 1995: 
Ideas and deeds only exist in dialectical relationship. So does violence, which is a 
habitus…., at once structured and structuring: structured because the idea of 
violence results from historical events, stored as the memory of past deeds, of 
past encounters, of past frustrations; and structuring because the idea of violence 
informs human actions, determines the acceptability; even the banality of 
violence, if not the ability to erase the scandal of its occurrence… (Dumont 1995: 
277) 
Violence here is at the same time witness and hider of the past. Past violent 
actions left deep scars in the region and the country that have influenced future 
responses, marked by indifference and fear that won’t allow a community 
reaction to global economical forces, as in other parts of the continent. Rather, 
violence is used at the same time as perpetrator and response for the 
vindications over rights and control over natural resources. 
1.2 Geographical and environmental starting point 
The research takes place in the Valley of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, a 
basin limited by four natural frontiers: at the North-East the Sierra Nevada of 
Santa Marta; at the South the East and Central ‘Cordilleras’ (mountain ranges) 
into which the Andes divide; at the East the Perijá hills; and to the West the 
Magdalena River, once the most important fluvial artery and still the largest 
river in Colombia.  
As expressed in a report by the English Geographer F.A.A. Simons in 
1881, “it is a vast valley covered with no less than dozens of rivers, streams, 
canals and creeks that flow from the mountains and Magdalena River to the 
sea, constituting an extraordinary water system.” Furthermore, its geological 
formations created a unique natural resources reserve described by Simons in 
his study of 1881 as follows: 
At the beginning of the 20th century the zone was marked by the establishment 
of haciendas in the lower part of the Sierra Nevada in the valley of the seven 
rivers.  At the end of the decade of 1870 many plantations were abandoned for 
the lack of commerce in the most important dominant city of the zone: Santa 
Marta, but the zone was specially adapted for the growth of cocoa, tobacco, 
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banana and sugar. Further in the valley there were large cattle ranchers near 
Valledupar with plantations of cotton, coffee and in Molino and Villanueva 
(White, 1978).  
Now most of the water that once irrigated the valley and the flora and 
fauna that once proudly covered this mythic space are almost inexistent. The 
competition between cattle ranching, unsustainable agriculture and extractive 
industries during almost one and a half centuries has left only few scarce 
vestiges of its once rich nature. 
Map 1 
 Sierra Nevada Valley in 1881 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Context of the cases analyzed 
Banana zone at the beginning of the 20th century 
The so called Banana Zone of Magdalena was marked by one of the worst 
massacres in Colombian history. In November 1928 the first numerous and 
organized protest of workers in the country took place. More than 32,000 
people, among them workers, peasants from this and other regions and 
representatives of political parties, were united in the Ciénaga city square to 
support the work stoppage convened by the trade union of the United Fruit 
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Company (El Tiempo, 20th November 1928). The trade union claimed better 
working conditions and their recognition as workers (White, 1978). 
The central government of Colombia, acting on UFC complaints, sent 
troops to control the situation. Unfortunately, the protest was ended by 
machine guns fired on protesters at the central plaza of Ciénaga, one of the 
most important banana supply points for the UFC, and where the protesters 
were supposed to meet the region’s Governor. Before dawn on the 6th of 
December, 1928, a platoon of soldiers opened fire on the protesters. The 
fatalities are still undetermined (Legrand, 1980). 
Coal zone at the beginning of the 21st century 
Almost one century after the above events, on March 12, 2001, a group of 
armed men forcibly stopped one of the private buses in charge of transporting 
miners for Drummond Ltd., forcing off it two of the passengers who were 
later found tortured and killed in a nearby town. The persons killed were 
Valmoré Locarno and Victor Orcasita, leaders of the Drummond trade-union 
in Colombia. On August 2nd, 2004 a group of armed men irrupted into the 
Michoacán parcel, department of Cesar, killing two of the farmer leaders of the 
peasant group. Since 1999 they have been threatened. The peasants were 
terrorized and displaced and their lands were illegally sold with false titles 
(Verdad Abierta, 2010).  
The killing of the Drummond trade union members has been at the 
national and international community’s attention for more than a decade. In 
2002 and 2009 the company was sued in United States courts for crimes 
committed against more than 600 peasants in the region between 1995 and 
2005 and for the death of three trade union leaders. The lands where these 
people were killed are now part of the domains exploited by Drummond Ltd. 
(Noticias Uno, 2011).  
What I try to convey here is how the region influenced the outsiders (in 
these two cases involving multinational companies) and how social relations of 
production--between the companies and local people--evolved in two different 
moments in time by using direct and indirect violence as means to get access to 
social fields of power. Characteristics existing in the province before UFC’s 
arrival to the Magdalena Banana Zone strongly influenced the company’s 
actions in the region (LeGrand, 1980). So did exactly the pre-existing violence 
in the Drummond trade union members and peasant killings cases. 
Local dynamics bring winners and losers to the multinational and local 
power game. But it is fundamental to understand how national and 
international political economy and political ecology evolved during this 
century to create conditions that interconnect one moment to the other and to 
the conditions of nature in Colombia now. 
In words of the first Colombian Minister for the Environment (1993-
1994), Manuel Rodríguez Becerra: “this region was condemned to destruction 
many years ago.” And this is what more than 100 years of extractive processes 
have left the region: isolation, misery, resource depletion and many forms of 
violence. 
13 
 
2   Theoretical and Analytical framework 
2.1 Theories that frame the study 
Political ecology of violence 
Environmental problems are economic, political and social in their origin. All 
societies across history have struggled for access and control over resources. 
Political Ecology involves the constantly changing dialectic between classes 
and groups of society and the use of natural resources (Blakie and Brookfield 
1987, P.17). Nevertheless to explain the conflicts arising in such dialogic 
relation we have to understand that the environment is  
… an arena of contested entitlements in which conflicts and claims over 
property, assets, labour and the politics of recognition are played out (Bohle and 
Fuenfgeld, 2007, p. 668). 
Since the World Commission on Environment and Development’s report “Our 
common future” was published in 1987, poverty has been convicted as a main 
cause of environmental deterioration. From that moment on, degrading 
activities of the poor were made visible; but the impacts of global patterns of 
production and the power exercised behind these patterns were rarely 
contemplated. As Wolfgang Sachs said, “ecology was reduced to a higher form 
of efficiency.” Therefore less awareness was put on environment sustainability 
and more on economic growth, since poverty was the main cause as well as 
effect of environmental problems (Escobar, 1996). 
After the end of Cold War -during the 1990s- some of the worst conflicts 
in recent times erupted, especially on the African continent. The over-
dimensioned military apparatuses of some of the big world powers were found 
useless. Environmental degradation and fighting over diminishing natural 
resources were portrayed to be central causes which justified the use of force 
to protect the threatened environmental resources. Theorists like Thomas 
Homer-Dixon (1991) (1994), Guenther Beachler (1996) and the journalist 
Robert Kaplan (1997) argued that human-induced pressures over natural 
resources were precursors of war and that scarcity was the phenomena behind 
the rising violence in Africa and other parts of the world (Fairhead, 2001). An 
apocalyptical Malthusian perspective of overpopulation and scarcity and 
Hobbes’ theory of a central government that could avert the generalized war 
were key starting points for such claims. It was called Environmental Security 
and became the central discourse of the so-called “Green” war. 
But if scarcity, overpopulation and unequal social distribution of resources 
are main causes of conflict, then something is needed to understand 
competition over natural resources wealth, and violence stemming from the 
power struggle to control it. In conflicts like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Sudan it cannot be claimed that neither resource 
poverty nor overpopulation were the triggers to violence. Confrontations were 
generated in each of these cases by the control over resources and strategic 
properties in their value chain, which means the operation of a varied range of 
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actors in an arena constituted by fields of power (Peluso & Watts, 2001). It is 
not what has been extracted from the soil but what is still inside that links 
environment to conflict (Fairhead, 2001, pp. 221-222). 
During this process of power struggle environmental degradation is 
performed intensely by forces in the international political-economy, but also 
by internal forces that are unleashed by the greed to have access to the 
resulting control apparatus. It is no surprise that the major destinations for 
resources extracted from the global south are industrialized nations whose 
markets hunger for diamonds, gold, industrial minerals or fossil fuels like oil or 
coal from developing countries (ibid., 2001, p. 215). It is no secret that 
developing countries don’t consume most of the natural resources extracted, 
but receive most of the impacts generated from the extraction: pollution, 
unequal distribution of resources and violence. 
At the end of 1990s the environmental entitlements approach emerged, to 
explain how differently placed social actors dominate environmental goods and 
services that are in turn fundamental for the welfare of society and individuals 
(Leach et al. 1999). Works like those of Gunter Beachler (1998), Thomas 
Homer Dixon (1999), Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000) were strongly 
questioned for their simplistic connection between natural resources, 
overpopulation, scarcity, migration and weak states. In 2001 Nancy Peluso and 
Michael Watts would take this approach as the starting point for their theory of 
Political Ecology of Violence, saying  
..It grants priority on how these entitlements are distributed, reproduced and 
fought over in the course of shaping and being shaped by patterns of 
accumulation (Peluso & Watts, 2001, p. 5). 
Peluso and Watts compiled works of diverse authors like Paul Richards, James 
McCarthy, James Fairhead and Betsy Hartmann, developing an elaborated 
theory to help understand the interaction between environment, access to 
resources and violence from a political ecology perspective. They differed from 
the environmental security approach of the 1990s by not searching for 
“environmental triggers of violent conflicts” and not affirming that “the 
violence tended to be endemic in a region of environmental crisis” (Peluso & 
Watts, 2001, p. 25). For them the precursor is not scarcity but the relations 
between users and nature, a reciprocal relationship between nature and humans 
in which labour is active, transformative and social (Peluso & Watts, 2001, p. 
27). 
We see violence a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and social 
relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation and power 
relations (Peluso & Watts, 2001, p.). 
Authors like Michael Ross in his 2006 “A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war” 
or Matthew Turner in “Political ecology and the moral dimensions of ‘resource conflicts’,” 
and many others like Jean and Rufin (1996), Kaldor (1999), N. Cooper (2002) 
Fearon (2004) Nordstrom (2004) still propose numerous different links 
between natural resources and violence, like the support of mineral revenues 
for the armed process of belligerents by Keen (1998) Weinstein (2007) who 
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argue that these revenues also shape motives of violence and behavior of 
armed groups. 
In this analysis I will make use of the model developed by Peluso and 
Watts, as the most indicated to compare how social relations of production 
and social fields of power interact in two specific areas of a region in two 
moments of time, managing therefore to understand how accumulative 
processes are related to violence. 
Power and violence 
Areas of natural resources wealth are centres of production and transformation 
of nature where capital accumulates and power is concentrated in the hands of 
few. Political Ecology of Violence analyzes the game of forces in which the 
most powerful get the most important portions of natural resources in dispute. 
These are the so called historically and culturally constituted “positions within 
precise systems of accumulation and fields of power.” For violence 
perpetrators the environment is invisible and present at the same time (Peluso 
& Watts, 2001, p. 6). To explain these complex dynamics Political Ecology of 
Violence makes use of three approaches.  
Property of natural resources and environmental practices shape social 
relations of production and social fields of power. Therefore “social relations of 
production as arenas of opportunity and constraint focus on three broad horizons”:  
1) Patterns and regimes of accumulation 
2) Forms of access and control over resources 
3) Actors that emerge from the social relations of production (Peluso 
and Watts 2001, p. 27-29) 
Accumulation: the force that fuels violence 
Capital is highly dynamic and inevitably expansionary. Powered by the engine of 
accumulation for accumulation’s sake and fuelled by the exploitation of labour 
power, it constitutes a permanently revolutionary force which perpetually 
reshapes the world we live in (Harvey, 1982, p. 156). 
Capital accumulation is the increase of wealth trough a delivered concentration 
of assets; it is the basis of capitalistic economic system where investments are 
pursued to get individual financial profit. For accumulation of profit inevitably 
a dispossession of others ensues. Accumulation processes of capitalism 
inevitably produce imbalance as a result: commoditization and privatization of 
land and forceful expulsion of peasants from their territories for the sake of 
industrial production, the exclusivity of private property rights and suppression 
of collective, common and state rights in favour of privatization, the 
commoditization of wage labour and suppression of alternative forms of 
production and/or consumption, the appropriation of natural resources and 
other kind of common assets (water, minerals, forests, etc.), the credit system 
as radical means of accumulation and the state as backer and promoter of all 
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the mentioned processes and many others that here are not mentioned 
(Harvey, 2003). 
The history of capitalism is replete with examples of pre-capitalist economies that 
have been destroyed and their populations proletarianized either by market 
forces or physical violence (Harvey 1982, p. 165). 
Colombia is a story of accumulative struggles in which the dynamics of 
violence intervene to complement and perpetuate political and economic 
power. Forces that attempt to counteract the international power of capital 
economy are forced down by direct, structural and cultural violence exercised 
against the weakest population who protest for their rights. 
2.2 Research questions 
Is violence cause or effect of accumulation? How is violence related to 
accumulation and isolation? 
 What does solitude or isolation mean to this particular region? How is it 
related to the absence of the state? How does it relate to accumulation 
and violence? 
 What are the accumulative patterns present in the region? How are they 
related to violence and the isolation of the region? 
 What does violence mean to this region? How does it interact with 
accumulation? What particular violence is exercised against society and 
natural resources? 
2.3 Frame of analysis 
Property of natural resources and environmental practices shape social 
relations of production and social fields of power. “Social relations of production as 
arenas of opportunity and constraint focus on three broad horizons” (Peluso & Watts, 
2001, pp. 27-29):  
 
17 
 
To better understand the interrelation of actors, forms of control and regimes 
of accumulation we have to analyze them by different aspects that interact to 
produce and reproduce violent environmental processes. 
This analytical model comprises the different stages that interact in the 
transformative process of nature. There, actors are first classified in four main 
groups that interact at four stages – local, regional, national and international – 
and are influenced by three systems or regimes: social, political and economic. 
Finally the process is shaped and shapes the dynamics of violence, leading to 
social imbalances and increasing disparities between actors. 
2.4 Methodology: a comparative historical analysis 
Comparative Historical Research is a method of social sciences that compares 
social processes across times and places. It examines historical events to create 
explanations that transcend particular epochs and geographies, comparing 
either directly, historically, theoretically or to facts of the present day (Mahoney 
& Rueschemeyer, 2003). It is a causal explanation that narrates sequential 
events and processes which indicate a chain of causes and effects (Schutt, 
2006). 
This method makes use of basically four stages to systematically compare 
the historical data collected: 
 Establish clearly the premise of the investigation, identifying events, facts 
and concepts that may explain the phenomena in the region analyzed.  
 Delimitate the location to be examined. 
 Compare and interpret the historical similarities and the differences.  
 Propose a causal explanation for the phenomena found, based on the 
information gathered (Schutt, 2006). 
This method is the most appropriate because it allows specifically 
analyzing secondary data and archival information to establish connections 
between the historical facts and present information. It also allows the 
researcher to compare and then interpret historical similarities and differences, 
which are required for analyzing two cases that happened within hundred years 
of difference. 
The historical-comparative revision of the materials here pursued was 
based on an exhaustive analysis of archival information, grey literature, policies, 
reports from the government, and data analysis from other researchers. 
Important information was also compiled from local and international media. 
Finally, some key actors like analysts of the conflict in the two moments of 
time, were interviewed to confront the different visions of the same reality.  
I conducted open interviews with three experts in different areas that 
helped me frame the extensive topics to be assessed. Professor Mauricio 
Archila Neira, Senior Researcher from the National University of Colombia in 
Bogota, and expert in the historic analysis of the Banana Massacre, contributed 
to the focus of the analysis on the Banana Zone. On the other hand, Manuel 
Rodríguez Becerra, first Minister of the Environment in 1993 and researcher 
from the Andes University in Bogota, shared a clear and profound assessment 
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of the environmental crisis during the present mining boom that led to the 
current environmental situation. Finally Alvaro Pardo, director of Colombia 
Punto Medio2 and former Director of Mining from the Mining and Energy 
Ministry during part of President Pastrana’s government and the beginning of 
President Uribe’s government, contributed with a very good analysis of the 
political-economic roots of the mining business in Colombia.  
3   Analysis of  the Banana Regime 
3.1 Patterns and regimes of accumulation: foundation of a 
banana republic 
Colombia and the world at the end of 19th Century  
At the dawn of the twentieth century, while the world was experiencing a 
polarization in political and economic contexts, Colombia’s economy woke up 
into an expansion of its primary goods exports. Oil, emeralds, coffee and 
bananas were central elements of this evolution. Globally, liberalism was being 
recognized as a leading economic, political and philosophic system in most 
western countries, for its acknowledgment of civil liberties and opposition to 
any kind of despotism from decaying monarchies of the time. On the other 
hand, the communist victory over three centuries of hegemonic monarchy rule 
in Russia and Lenin’s interpretation of the Marxist model brought another 
alternative to social and economic organization. This model communalized the 
social means of production, becoming at the time a major challenge to the 
emerging capitalist powers in the consolidation of their power.  
Banana markets were mainly gathered in the European continent and 
North America, but it was the extraordinary growth of urban markets in the 
United States in the last decade of the 19th century, and the concentration of 
capitals for the required investment in transport and marketing, that favoured 
its commercialization and set the basis for the florescence of the Banana 
Empire in Latin America in the first decades of the 20th century (White, 1978). 
At the end of the 19th century Colombia was a simple mercantile economy, 
based not on capital investments but on production of goods by independent 
manufacturers or direct workers subject to pre-capitalist relations (Moncayo, 
2008, p. 93). The country’s natural tendency, unfortunately persistent until 
now, was to act as a supplier of primary goods for metropolitan countries and 
an open market for consumer goods that were not produced locally. 
UFC’s partners (Lorenzo Dow Baker, Minor C. Keith and Andrew 
Preston) built their initial capital by commercializing different kinds of 
agricultural products during the second half of the 19th century (Agudelo 
Velazquez, 1989). They achieved their first profits buying green banana 
bunches in Morant, Jamaica, for USD$0.20 cents and selling them later in 
                                                
2Social movement in Colombia for responsible mining 
http://www.colombiapuntomedio.com/ 
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Boston for USD$3.00 dollars (Agudelo Velazquez, 1989). The Banana Empire 
was built in only five decades, a short period to convert small-scale salesmen 
into controllers of regional economies and the wages of thousands of labourers 
in producing countries like Honduras, Jamaica, Costa Rica and Colombia 
(White, 1978). 
Their influence on social, political and economic elites in Latin American 
countries would later shape the pejorative term “Banana Republics” (Bucheli, 
2004) for countries under the great power of the UFC. The company managed 
to dominate 77% of worldwide banana exports in 1910 (Agudelo Velazquez, 
1989), a great commercialization net in the United States in Europe, and a fleet 
of 86 ships (the so-called white fleet) by 1928. Ships were equipped with the 
most advanced refrigeration technology available which allowed them to move 
fruit supply from one region to another according to the most convenient 
market possibilities. The transportation and commercial monopolies in their 
banana enclaves made them able to import and export additional goods as well, 
influencing local economies and even central governments (White, 1978). 
Arrival of the UFC to ‘Magdalena Grande’ 
Before the arrival of UFC in Magdalena an exuberant rainforest naturally 
irrigated by hundreds of rivers, streams and creeks nourished by the melt 
waters generated in the Snow Mountains of the “Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta” covered the entire region. Agricultural production was dedicated to 
local consumption, and the boundaries between private and public properties 
remained undefined, while the demand for land was minimal due to the 
subsistence scheme prevailing in the zone. The only industry was timber 
exploitation to provide fuel wood and construction material to the nearest 
cities, Barranquilla, Ciénaga and Santa Marta (Agudelo Velazquez, 1989). 
The banana business did not begin with the UFC. In 1887 Local 
Magdalena entrepreneurs associated with Colombian emigrants to the United 
States first attempted large scale banana production, dispatching the first 
export trade from Santa Marta to the port of New York in 1891. Their scarce 
experience in the transportation and storage of bananas, however, caused huge 
losses that forced the new entrepreneurs to sell part of their lands to pay the 
enormous debts. The buyer of their lands turned out to be a real estate 
business, Colombian Land Company, belonging to Minor C. Keith, one of the 
founders of the UFC (Viloria, 2009). 
In 1897, the firm monopolized the purchase of arable lands (5,500 
hectares) on both sides of the railway line between Aracataca and Santa Marta. 
The financial and organizational capacity of companies controlled by Minor C. 
Keith and his partners brought the necessary capital for business growth in the 
region. Magdalena production and exports increased from 75,000 bunches in 
1891 to 485,000 in 1899 (Viloria, 2009).  
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Political economy of bananas 
Colombia began the 20th century immersed in a terrible crisis during the 
presidency of José Manuel Marroquín (1900-1904). The country was dealing 
with one of its worst internal conflicts (“The Thousand Days’ War” 1899-
1902) that killed 3% of the country’s total population and was accompanied by 
a lack of access to international credits, insignificant levels of exports and a 
hyper-inflation of 300%. Additionally, the country was facing the loss of the 
Panama Canal to the United States (Kalmanovitz & López, 2002).  
Rafael Reyes assumed the presidency (1904-1909) at such a critical period 
for Colombia’s economy. Reyes, a businessman himself, was perhaps the first 
president that attempted to apply a capitalist economic model in Colombia 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2002). He focused his government plan on three basic 
strategies: establishment of fiscal monopolies, financial stimulus to attract 
foreign investment, and increased public investment to improve infrastructure 
in different regions of the country (Viloria, 2009).  
It was a moment of incredible growth in the export of large scale capitals 
by Europe and the United States (White, 1978), and the amazing fertility of 
soils and strategic location near the port of Santa Marta definitely attracted the 
eyes of UFC partners to the region for further development of their already 
growing business. Therefore, in 1901, with the “Thousand Days’ War” about 
to end, the UFC established operations in Colombia (Viloria, 2009). The 
company took advantage of strategic conditions but also of the low wages 
offered in the Magdalena region to establish one of its most important supply 
points for the next 30 years. 
In 1909, pressured by local elites in Magdalena, Reyes granted specific tax 
exemptions for banana production and export (applicable until 1929) which 
favoured the consolidation of large scale banana plantations already present in 
the region and a massive growth of the UFC’s banana business. Financial 
incentives for foreign capital investments were an important factor in the 
company’s expansion in Colombia. During Reyes’ Presidency (from 1908 to 
1910) UFC acquired more than 13,000 hectares near Aracataca and developed 
its own irrigation districts (148,400 meters), later deviating rivers like the 
Tucurinca. 
Land Rush for green gold 
The agricultural frontier was also expanded by Reyes’ public land allotment 
policy which was created to promote new production in unoccupied lands 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2002). Over 12,000 hectares of vacant lands in the 
Magdalena department were made available to national and foreign investors in 
agriculture destined for export. A titling rush was unleashed in the region. 
Landowners from the Caribbean coast, investors from other regions of the 
country and even president Reyes acquired large extensions of land for banana 
plantations (Viloria, 2009, pp. 32-33).  
New plantations extended to the department’s south and by 1912 the 
municipality of Aracataca - García Márquez’ Macondo - was founded as a 
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direct result. The railway was extended from Sevilla to Fundación to pick up 
the fruit from newly opened virgin forests where investors fought over terrains 
in a frenetic rush for plantations and a blind greed for wealth. The rising 
interest of Colombian investors not only concealed the crucial role of foreign 
investment in the banana boom but also the configuration of an export 
monopoly (White, 1978). Typical tropical rainforest vegetation was replaced by 
endless rows of banana plants that soon characterized the region.  
In 1915 more than 14,300 hectares were cultivated in the Magdalena 
department; 6,050 hectares (42%) belonged to the UFC and 5,800 hectares 
(40%) to particular growers besides other banana companies that were slowly 
being absorbed by UFC. By 1920 the total cultivated area had increased to 
30,800 hectares, of which 50% belonged to the UFC, and during the 1920s an 
additional 18,000 hectares were incorporated (Viloria, 2009). The company 
invested a total of US$ 70 million in Magdalena by 1921, an exorbitant sum for 
the time and especially for a region with scarce development (White, 1978). 
The company reported more than US$ 44 million in earnings at the moment. 
Large scale operations and the huge capital managed by UFC allowed it to 
buy or eliminate any rival in the Magdalena department during the first three 
decades of the 20th century, as in the case of Cuyamel and Atlantic Fruit 
Company in 1928 (White, 1978). The region thus experienced an intense 
expansion of banana production that reached a 1929 export peak of more than 
10 million stems annually, from the port of Santa Marta to other continents.  
Banana exports grew without interruption from 1901 to 1913 and declined 
at the beginning of the First World War. Again in 1916 a period of export 
increases began that ended in 1930, when the company exported about 11 
million bunches only from the Colombian Banana Zone (Viloria, 2009). 
Between 1929 and 1934 a contraction of the international markets and 
successive hurricanes in the region forced the company to decrease plantation 
areas by 75%, which were hardly recovered later (LeGrand, 1980). 
Graph 1 
 Export of banana from Magdalena Department, 1891-1935 
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The high growth in production caused many tensions between the different 
actors in the region and found its critical point in the massive killing at the 
Ciénaga Square in 1928. Its aggressive policy of land buying and appropriation 
of vacant lands in Magdalena would confront the company with peasants, 
landowners, producers and on occasions with the Colombian authorities. But 
the company established a good interaction with local and national elites which 
allowed it to maintain power in the region for more than six decades. 
3.2 Forms of access and control over resources and actors 
that emerge from the social relations of production 
The dynamics of Banana Society and political relations 
In the 1920s the United Fruit Company (UFC) dominated the different 
spheres of economic, social and political life in the banana zone. No doubt that 
its investments in the Magdalena department led to the emergence of profound 
transformations in land tenure and social patterns, like privatization of lands 
and large scale migration to the region. At the same time the company had to 
adapt to the existing “social relations of production and social fields of power” 
(Peluso & Watts, 2001) in the region, represented in work practices, social and 
political patterns and forms of land tenancy (LeGrand, 2008).  
Before UFC’s arrival in the region, the “Magdalena Grande” department, 
as it was known then, was barely inhabited; the capital city of Santa Marta had 
approximately 6,000 residents and the town of Ciénaga – second in importance 
for the region – comprised only a few fishermen’s cottages. Existing 
settlements were composed of scattered semi-abandoned colonial “haciendas” 
and small villages of colonizers on vacant public lands. Circa 1930, at the peak 
of the banana boom, Santa Marta’s population increased to 30,000 inhabitants 
and Ciénaga’s to about 40,000 citizens (Taylor, 1931) (Agudelo Velazquez, 
1989). 
 
Joint venture of UFC and conservative elites 
The department’s elites, mainly of Conservative party affiliation, lived in the 
capital city Santa Marta and owned the mentioned immense semi-abandoned 
and almost valueless properties located mainly in Aracataca and the Riofrío 
zone. On the other hand, the second most important city, Ciénaga, was 
inhabited by owners of medium size properties belonging mostly to the Liberal 
Party that didn’t integrate easily with the demands of the company and that 
resented the special treatment the company offered to regional elites (LeGrand, 
2008).  
UFC understood very early on the power represented in regional social-
economical elites that could influence other spheres of the national political 
power. Evidently the company favored businessmen belonging to such elites, 
as a way to gain their support in times when they had to negotiate with regional 
and central governments or press liberal entrepreneurs in the later process of 
monopolization (Viloria, 2009). One of the richest families of the region, who 
signed production agreements with the UFC in 1908, received company loans 
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at low rates to buy additional lands that were later acquired by UFC at 
convenient prices. The family pressured the central government to grant tax 
exemption for banana production until 1929 (Viloria, 2009). 
Traditional wealthy families normally benefited from company credits at 
low interest, purchase of lands at affordable prices or subsequent contracts of 
estates given in administration and purchase contracts of banana production 
(LeGrand, 2008) (White, 1978). Members of these families occupied high 
positions both in the company and in the government of Magdalena and 
Colombia in general (Viloria, 2009) (White, 1978), so the alliance was of mutual 
benefit for both parts. 
UFC strengthened its power in the region through associations that 
sometimes resulted in outrageous and objectionable circumstances. UFC 
employees simultaneously operated as Departmental Assembly deputies, 
creating clear conflicts of interest. As a result of these associations, 
representatives of the Ministry of Industries detected in 1924 that of 35,400 
hectares of the nation’s vacant lands, 32,9000 were acquired irregularly by the 
UFC (Viloria, 2009) (White, 1978).  
These facts demonstrated the weakness of the state and the company’s 
power of corruption, one of the characteristics that remain until now in 
enclave regions like Magdalena. 
 
Disputes between the UFC and Renegade liberals 
Company relations with the liberal “mestizos” of Ciénaga were not at all 
cordial. Several times they attempted to sign agreements with UFC competitors 
to obtain better conditions in harvest purchases; however, they were always 
blocked by the power of the company that maintained control of the ports 
(White, 1978). In the fruit selection process Ciénaga’s producers were 
subjected to even stricter controls than the rest of the growers (LeGrand, 
2008). 
Banana was an extremely unpredictable business, and the producers had to 
compete to get the company to buy the most quantity of fruit, due to the 
constant changes in market demand and the fragility of fruit to be kept in 
storages. It is calculated that only two thirds of the fruit produced would be 
bought for export, the rest would be rejected. But for opponents to the banana 
regime, the company rejected between 60% and 70% of their harvest (Viloria, 
2009).  
UFC took advantage of these tensions and divided producers to maintain 
its power (White, 1978). Imbalanced relations with the company as well as the 
monopolization of the business, infrastructure, financial assets and even food 
created conflicts that would trigger the tragic conclusion of 1928. 
Migrant proletariat and peasant society 
During the first two decades of the 20th century growth in the banana 
economy attracted not only investors but a massive migration of workers from 
other parts of the country to the region. Before UFC arrived the almost 
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nonexistent jobs available paid around $0.30 cents a day, but when the 
company started production the workers were paid around $9 pesos per week. 
This generated a rise in prices local economy prices that would affect 
inhabitants of the region for years (Taylor, 1931). Better salaries attracted a 
large number of immigrants from other regions of the Caribbean coast and the 
inner departments, looking for improved economic conditions and new 
opportunities for their families. 
Although the plantation salaries were better in comparison to other parts 
of the country, they were far less than in other producing countries (Viloria, 
2009). The wages paid to Colombian workers ($0.50 cents/day) were low in 
comparison with Costa Rica and Jamaica, where the average salary was 
US$1.00/day (White, 1978).  
The newcomers were contracted by UFC and local growers by piecework 
and for seasonal periods (White, 1978). This kind of contract allowed “Mamita 
Yunay3” to assure that it had no workers in the region, thus evading payment 
of social security mandated by Colombian Law (LeGrand, 2008) (Viloria, 
2009). In 1925, from an estimated 25,000 workers, only 5.000 had a direct 
contract with the UFC (Viloria, 2009). Labourers had to work in harsh 
conditions: long hours and poor sanitation. (See Appendix 1).  
Not all workforces were constituted by migrants; some of them were small 
scale peasants and new settlers that didn’t incorporate immediately into the 
banana industry. Instead, during the first years of expansion this peasant 
society supplied local markets with agricultural products to feed the suddenly 
increased population. Nevertheless at the same time they were seasonal 
workers at the plantations (LeGrand, 1980). It is possible that UFC may have 
expelled settlers, not only because they needed their land but also because their 
labour was necessary for the plantations’ expansion (LeGrand, 1980, p. 240). 
This segment of society was also greatly impacted by the installation of 
commissary stores by the UFC, where the company sold only imported goods. 
The system impeded workers from acquiring local products, as they were paid 
in vouchers that only could be redeemed at UFC stores (LeGrand, 1980, p. 
241). This condemned small peasants to lose their livelihoods and lands, 
leaving them only the option to sell their work to survive. 
Asymmetrical forces on land disputes 
UFC confronted great frictions with local peasants for the land. As explained 
before, cultivation expansion caused a massive privatization of public lands. It 
generated conflicts that led to the expropriation of hundreds or perhaps 
thousands of settlers already living or recently installed in the region (LeGrand, 
1980). Competition caused a rise in property prices and--as described in the 
previous section--a rush for the best available lands. Many traditional families 
sought old colonial titles in their genealogies in which boundaries were unclear 
and claimed as their own abutting vacant state lands to be sold later to the 
UFC. The company so accumulated approximately 60,000 hectares of private 
                                                
3 So was the United Fruit Company called by the local workers. 
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property. Others sought government concessions to start new plantations 
(LeGrand, 1980). A territorial clash soon became inevitable. 
The lack of boundary clarifications between private and state properties 
was a major cause of conflicts and the most affected were as always the 
weakest in society: small peasants and new settlers. The state only intervened 
when the company began to move in the direction of medium- to large-sized 
agricultural producers. (See case in Appendix 2.) 
The majority of conflict events involved the UFC supported by local 
authorities who invariably used force against peasants who resisted eviction. In 
these cases armed forces recurred to diverse violent practices such as burning 
of houses, setting imprisonment of family representatives, or setting cattle 
loose to devour the crops existent on the property (White, 1978). All this 
generated strong discontent in the working class and the small peasant society 
against the injustices of government and the UFC. 
 
Everyday resistance and the Revolutionary Socialist Party 
All the above-mentioned tensions generated different forms of resistance 
among settlers, small peasants and workers. At the beginning the settlers 
resisted the processes of land usurpation, but after the violent events in which 
armed forces were involved they claimed protection from the central 
government, as well as from the courts, to preserve their rights. Although 
many of the attempts to defend their properties were unsuccessful, they 
generated the conviction in the rural population that the UFC obtained lands 
belonging to the state illegally, and according to the law they were in position 
to reclaim this property as later occurred (LeGrand, 1980). 
The first organized attempts in the region began in 1925 with the 
foundation of the “Trade Union of Workers of Magdalena4(TUWM)”, and 
later under the influence of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, founded in 1926 
(LeGrand, 2008). The trade union was influenced by Spanish and Italian 
immigrants with anarcho-syndicalist ideas and assembled workers as well as 
small scale peasants in the region. Although the trade union’s efforts supported 
the claims of peasants threatened with eviction by the UFC, its main efforts 
were directed towards organizing a general strike against the company 
(LeGrand, 1980). 
After 1929 the banana economy experimented a deep recession due to the 
contraction of international markets and successive hurricanes in the zone. 
UFC diminished its activities and thousands of workers lost their jobs. In this 
situation, many of the unemployed who had been peasants before assumed an 
offensive attitude, occupying UFC properties to grow subsistence crops. The 
company lost about 9,500 hectares between 1930 and 1935 that they never 
recovered again. Displacement was reversed because many of the invaders 
claimed the property from the government as legal settlers, according to 
Colombian land property rules (LeGrand, 1980). 
 
                                                
4 Unión Sindical de Trabajadores del Magdalena USTM. 
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Massacre of 1928 rejection of symbolic enemy 
The 1928 strike was the first organized massive mobilization of the rural 
population in the region. Between 25,000 and 32,000 workers (Viloria, 2009) 
participated in the stoppage of company activities for more than three weeks, 
until the tragic outcome of the dawn of 6th December 1928 when the 
Colombian army fired against an unarmed population whose main motivation 
was to claim better working conditions and a space for peasants’ food 
cultivation. It marked a singular event in the Colombian collective memory, 
described by García Márquez in his book One Hundred Years of Solitude. 
The massacre was greatly influenced by the polarization between 
traditional democracies and communist regimes. Most of the messages 
revealed by the Ministries, the U.S. Embassy and UFC would bring about the 
fatal ending. A complete analysis is shown in Appendix 3.  
What is true is that hegemonic actors transformed the initial image of a 
labour conflict to a problem of war. Although the indubitable intention of the 
socialist’s movement to spur an insurrection seems evident, this was far from 
being “guerrilla warfare.” Therefore, the Army’s reaction was 
disproportionately exaggerated: in using machine guns against strikers who 
“performed civil resistance actions and fraternization with the troops to disarm 
them,” adducing loss of authority was not enough argument for the massacre 
(Archila, 2008, p. 167). 
Let us analyze what happened one hundred years after the expansion of 
the Banana Regime in the Valley of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta. 
4 Analysis of  the Coal Regime  
4.1 Patterns and regimes of accumulation: the Mining Rush 
To understand the mining voracity that Colombia is currently facing, we have 
to deal first with the previous period of Colombian political-economy, framed 
by the fall of communism in the late 1980s and the global diffusion of neo-
liberalism that supposed a crisis of the welfare state and a clearing of many 
previous conquests in labour rights (Archila, et al., 2012, p. 64). 
As we have seen previously, in 1990 Colombia adopted a neo-liberal 
model that determined GDP growth as the means to accomplish development 
and deal with poverty. Markets were liberalized and international investments 
were encouraged. The mining sector was one of the promised means for this 
future growth. Extraordinary reserves in minerals all over the country had 
already been discovered by the Spanish during colonization (gold, emeralds, 
platinum, silver), and in this century other minerals acquired importance (oil, 
ferronickel, coltan and coal). Immense reserves of the purest steam coals in the 
continent (7 billion Mt measured and 16 billion more calculated) were 
sufficient argument to promote Colombia as a mining hub for the 
industrialized world (Ministerio de Minas y Energía - UPME, 2006, p. 27).  
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Studies hired by the Colombian government in the 60s, 70s and 80s 
demonstrated the potential for steam coal exploitation and its possibility for 
international commercialization as a means for economic growth and 
subsequent sustainable development of the regions where the most important 
reserves were located. The departments of La Guajira (4,536 Mt measured) and 
El Cesar (6.556 Mt measured) (Petri, 1960) (Petri, 1961-1963) (Garcés 
González, 1976) (Charlton & Pontin, 1975) (Mejía, 1977) (Restrepo Londoño, 
1981) were recommended for a clean exploitation that would bring the country 
out of the economic crisis that affected Latin America in the late 1970s and 
1980s. 
It was during the oil crisis of the 1970s that the eyes of the world turned 
to coal as an alternative to replace the space left by fueloil, which slowly was 
being discarded in global electricity generation. Thus, the government sought 
in1976 specialized partners who could provide the best technology to properly 
perform the extraction operation in the principal areas of reserves (Salas, 
2004). 
Export began in La Guajira with the El Cerrejón mine operated by a joint 
venture between multinational capital (Exxon/Intercor) and the Colombian 
state (Carbocol). Nevertheless low international prices and high operational 
costs made business unfeasible (Labyx, 1992). Yet the constant world demand 
increase and recovery of prices during the second half of the 1980s made 
Colombian coal business again atractive for multinational mining investment 
(Ministerio de Minas y Energía - UPME, 2006, p. 13) 
A transnational specialized in coal extraction with mines in Alabama, 
United States, Drummond Ltd. acquired the rights to explore/exploit the 
mines of Pribbenow and La Loma in Cesar department. Drummond started 
explorations at the end of the 1980s and exploitation and exporting in 1995 
(Drummond Ltd. Colombia, 2012) after signing a contract with the Colombian 
government that has brought about the lowest tax rates and royalties in the 
coal sector for years (Idarraga, et al., 2010). 
Economical and legal changes 
At the end of 1998 Colombia was experiencing a fall in GDP of 6.7%, an 
unemployment rate of 20% and a generalized financial crisis (Ministerio de 
Minas y Energía, UPME, 2005). An extended agreement with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was signed in 1999 to “reduce poverty and modernize 
the state” by cutting down public expenses and moving along a “strong and 
sustained economic growth to promote employment and higher living 
standards for Colombians” (Ministerio de Hacienda - FMI, 1999, pp. 4-8). 
Privatization of a great number of financial, telecommunications, energy and 
mining institutions was part of the agreement, and so Carbocol--the company 
created to administer coal exploitation--was sold in October 2000 to a 
multinational consortium. 
In 2001, with assistance from the World Bank, the government of 
President Andrés Pastrana abolished the existing Mining Law: Decree 2655 of 
1988.  The new law supposed a switch in the state’s role in mining exploitation 
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from entrepreneur to absent supervisor, the reinforcement of exclusive 
property of subsoil resources, and the right to expropriate assets from any 
individual or communities in their possession in favour of “public utility and 
social interest”. 
Art 5: The minerals of any kind and location, lying on the ground or subsoil, in 
any natural physical state, are the exclusive property of the State, without regard 
to the ownership, possession or possession of the relevant land, whether of other 
public, individuals or communities or groups. 
Article 13: In implementing Article 58 of the Constitution, be declared of public 
utility and social interest the mining industry in all its branches and phases. 
Therefore be decreed in its favor, at the request of an interested party and the 
procedures established in this Code, the expropriation of the property of real 
estate and other rights constituted thereon, which are necessary for their exercise 
and efficient development. (Law 685 of 2001). 
Other aspects highly criticized by public opinion were Chapter 14 and 16 that 
handled participation of ethnic communities and regulation of cottage and 
informal mining respectively. Another important part as regards this paper is 
the environmental aspect handled in Chapter 20. It transfers responsibility of 
environmental, social and economic baseline setting to mining companies and 
does not include any review of environmental impacts during the normal 
deterioration process of the next decades (See articles 203, 207 and 208). 
Finally, Article 213 places high obstacles for the state in denying environmental 
licenses. It obstructs the state in fulfilling its role as “supervisor of the natural 
resources.” 
The reality of Colombian mining policies seems to be determined by 
impositions of international commercial interests supported by a high lobbying 
capacity and the massive capitals of mining multinationals. Therefore mining 
giants have obtained in Colombia financial benefits, tax exemptions and few 
restrictions in the use of natural resources.  
Unrestricted expansion in mining 
Continuing Colombia’s transformation to attract mining investment, President 
Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) implemented two national plans for the sector: 
PNDM5 2002-2006 reinforced the role of the state as absolute owner of 
subsoil and manager of its use for the “well-being of all citizens” (UPME, 
2002), and PNDM 2007-2010 positioned mining as a contributor to 
“sustainable development of the hosting regions and the country’s 
understanding of mining as a process by which natural resources become the 
economic capital required to create or enhance other forms of capital” 
(UPME, 2007, p. 5). In addition, the PNDM: Vision 20196  (National 
Development Mining Plan) was launched in 2006, transcending particular 
                                                
5 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Minero – National Plan for Mining Development. 
6 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Minero: Visión 2019– National Plan for Mining 
Development: 2019Vision. 
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government plans and setting a State goal that established higher goals for 
mining economic performance. Some of its objectives were: 1) to turn the 
country into one of the first three destinations of private investment in Latin 
America, 2) to achieve a mining GDP growth above Latin American average 
and a participation in the nation’s GDP of 25% by the end of 2019, and 3) To 
double the production of coal (to 120 Mt by 2019) as one of the strategic 
minerals for its potential in the mining industry (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 
UPME, 2005, pp. 75-81).  
The result of these high projections was a generalized increase in the total 
mining production (65.4% growth in the 8 years of Uribe’s period), an 
uncontrolled growth in concession areas and a complete “rush” in the titling 
process (see Graph1). Before President Uribe, 1.05 million hectares were  
Graph 1 
 
already granted for mining, but after his two consecutive terms the total area 
granted in concessions rose to 8.44 million hectares (Rudas, 2011) and over 40 
million hectares more were requested for titling (almost 35% of Colombia’s 
territory), exceeding any governmental capacity to adequately manage the 
pressures generated on the territory and natural resources (Rudas, 2010, p. 50). 
Other effects of the PDNM Vision 2019 were the growth of the total mining 
exports from US$1.5 billion to US$9.4 billion (UPME, 2012) and an increase in 
coal exports from 36.5 to 64.5 million Mt during the same period (SIMCO, 
2012). Success in mining expansion goals nevertheless did not reflect any 
amelioration of the human conditions and protection of natural resources, as 
will be shown in the next facts.  
In addition, as part of government’s agreement with the IMF in 2003 to 
achieve fiscal savings, a restructuring and downsizing of the state was 
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implemented (Ministerio de Hacienda - FMI, 2003, p. 7). Many ministries were 
merged and institutions and offices were eliminated. Merging covered many 
sectors, but it is important to underline here the effects on SINA7  as well as 
the Rural and Mining systems. The savings aim was never reached as shown by 
the recent re-division of the institutions during the present government of Juan 
Manuel Santos. Instead all divided institutions were weakened, hardly fulfilling 
their main duties due to reduction of available personnel and resources to cope 
with normal demands, much less to respond to increased demand in the 
mining sector (Rudas, 2010).   
Graph 2 
 
Demand increase for mining titling and speeding up of production in the 
sector was accompanied--since 2005--by a decrease in the budget for 
environmental authorities, making it difficult for such institutions to verify and 
control the negative impact over natural resources - See Graph 2. Similar 
situations were faced by institutions in charge of land legalization and mining 
grants like Incoder8 and Ingeominas9 all of which resulted in a generalized 
fragility in the country’s institutions and difficulties in exercising an adequate 
environmental and territorial planning control (Rudas, 2010). 
                                                
7 SINA– Sistema Nacional Ambiental (National Environmental System). 
8 Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural: in charge of land. 
9 Instituto Colombiano de Geología y Minas (Colombian Institute of Geology and 
Mining) in charge of the exploration of subsoil and until recently of mine titling. 
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Consequently, supervision of mining extraction and its outcomes is far 
from rigorous, as stated in various Constitutional Court Sentences (e.g. C339 
of 2002) and reports of General Comptroller’s office CGN10. In 2006 CGN 
criticized continuous changes (from 1996 to 2006) in the administration of the 
mining sector leading to inconsistent results in mining supervision. 
 
Legacy of rampant mining titling 
The government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2014) inherited an exorbitant 
mine titling request of about 35% of the total Colombian territory (See map 6). 
When the current government took office, a severe institutional crisis in the 
mining sector was found. A radical institutional reform was announced to 
tackle the precarious auditing capacity of the state to meet standards and 
commitments in the activity (Rodado, 2011). Santos based his government plan 
in the so called “five locomotives” for economic growth and employment 
generation (mining/energy, housing, transport infrastructure, innovation and 
agriculture). The mining and energy locomotive had a high possibility of 
growth due to increased projections in the coal, oil and gold subsectors. 
Nevertheless it was recognized as an “enormous responsibility for 
environmental management” because mining expansion may go “counter to 
the country’s sustainable development” (DNP, 2010).  
Serious deficiencies in human, technical and financial resources made it 
difficult to fulfil the government’s regulatory function in the use of 
underground natural resources. The present government took drastic measures 
such as suspension of the mining titling process, a prerequisite to start 
exploration actions and subsequent exploitation. Serious inconsistencies in the 
process were found (Servicio Geológico Colombiano SGC, 2012). Although 
the National Agency for Mining 11(ANM) and National Agency for 
Environmental Licenses (ANLA)12 were created this year to regulate mining 
requests, and results have a prudential waiting period, the situation is critical. 
After two years of the current administration, problems have barely changed as 
shown by different sector and special reports of the CGR Office, 
demonstrating the existing institutional chaos in the mining and environmental 
sectors as well as their poor capacity in the auditing, monitoring and control of 
mining’s impact on environmental resources (Contraloría General de la 
República, 2011, p. 15) (Contraloría General de la República, 2012). Other 
reports from this institution evidence millionaire fiscal evasions and losses in 
royalties from the mining sector. A recent declaration by the General 
Comptroller, Sandra Morelli, asserts that “the country is about to confront an 
environmental disaster” (Amat, 2012) resulting from cases like Drummond’s 
and Prodeco/Glencore’s that didn’t comply with the water pollution 
                                                
10 CGR Contraloría General de la Repúbica (Republic’s General Comptroller Office), 
Informe de Auditoría Gubernamental con enfoque integral modalidad regular 
Ingeominas, agosto 31 de 2007. 
11 ANM Agencia Nacional de Minería (National Mining Agency). 
12 ANLA Agencia Nacional de Licencias Ambientales (National Agency of 
Environmental Licenses). 
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management, transported coal without proper coverage, spilled huge amounts 
of coal during the loading of ships contaminating sea and beaches, deviated 
rivers, etc. (Contraloría General de la República, 2012, p. 26).  
The Cesar coal basin has a high to very high tendency to become a desert area in 
the medium term (2070) and to continue the large scale open pit mining can be 
extremely inconvenient in terms of the impacts that will continue to occur and 
increase over the water resources. (Contraloría General de la República, 2012, p. 
26) 
In 2011 the Mining Ministry planned to raise coal exports to 70 million tons in 
2012 and 250 million in 2018, bringing more municipalities into coal 
exploitation as can be seen in the following maps of the department of Cesar. 
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This expansion of mining will suppose the resettlement of peasant and 
urban communities as ordered by the Ministry of Environment (Resolution 
1525 of 2010) which in turn will suppose a higher impact on population, social 
and environmental aspects in the country in the following years (Holguín, 
2011).  
Result over years of implementing a neoliberal model include the 
conversion of the state into an absent participant in the mining business, an 
irrational promoter of multinational investment, a deficient supervisor of the 
use of natural resources and an active restrictor of the rights of individuals, as 
happened one hundred years before. The Colombian state has been subdued 
to the directives of international economic organizations, reducing its 
capacities to cope with its social, political and economic functions. Instead it 
was limited to regulate and make necessary corrections in favour of “free 
competition” in the mining sector, facilitating international investment but not 
necessarily providing real welfare to the general population or protection to 
nature (Idarraga, et al., 2010). 
4.2 Forms of access and control over resources 
The control over the Coal Zone: a repeated violence 
The Cesar department was once famous for its cotton-rice plantations, its 
immense cattle herds and its richness in water. The subsequent marijuana 
bonanzas in the 1970s and 1980s spawned an uncontrollable violence from 
guerrillas and paramilitary groups in the 1990s and 2000s. Cesar was part of the 
Department called Greater Magdalena until 1967, when it was created by 
Congress. Agriculture and cattle ranching (1.5 million heads) were for years the 
principal income sources for the department, but in the last decade the 
department’s economy has become dependent on coal extraction. 
As said before, Drummond Ltd. started explorations in the late 1980s and 
extractions in 1995 in the municipalities of La Jagua de Ibirico, Chiriguaná, El 
Paso, La Loma and Becerril, at the center of the department of Cesar. Now ten 
coal mining companies operate in the region: Carbones de la Jagua, Consorcio 
Minero Unido, Carbones del Tesoro, Sororia-Drummond (Cerro Largo), 
Norcarbón S.A., Carbones del Caribe S.A., C.I Prodeco/Glencore 
(Calenturitas and La Jagua), Drummond (La Loma and El Descanso, 
Emcarbón, Vale Coal (El Hatillo) and Carbones del Cesar (La Francia). 
Nevertheless 70% of the department’s total production and 33% of the 
country’s is performed by Drummond Ltd. (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2008). 
Changes in society and landscapes 
Growing coal exploitation in Cesar has introduced changes in landscapes, 
livelihoods, society and the economy of the region. According to estimates by 
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the DANE13, mining raised its participation in Cesar’s GDP from 8% in 1990 
to 34% in 2005, while the agricultural sector reduced its share from 45% to 
24% in the same period (Bonet, 2007). Finalizing the exploration stage in the 
center of Cesar in the early 1990s, titled lands and vacant areas of the 
municipalities of El Paso, La Jagua de Ibirico, Chiriguaná and Becerril, among 
others, were given in concession for mining in 1997 by INGEOMINAS14. The 
reserves lying in El Descanso only started coal and gas exploitation in 2009. 
Negotiation was the responsibility of the locally installed company, and 
conciliation with parcel landowners was the responsibility of the mining 
company, otherwise the state had to expropriate. 
This was accompanied by a total neglect of rural development during the 
following years, especially in policies related to the development of small scale 
peasantry. The dramatic change resulting has meant the practical “extinction of 
peasant economy in the region”, a complete deficiency in food crops and the 
conversion of rural communities with access to land into settlements of 
landless rural workers dependent on few indirect and temporary vacancies 
offered by the mining companies (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2008). Drummond 
occupies around 3,600 workers in direct jobs, 2,700 contractors and 15,000 
indirect jobs. With full production of the additional El Descanso mine (started 
in 2009) Drummond will reach a production of 45 million tons, thereby raising 
direct jobs to 6,200, contractors to 5,000 and indirect jobs to around 25,000. 
This is only about 4% of the total population of the department, not even 
close to the 22% of the total population that has been displaced until now in 
the department of Cesar (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 DANE Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (Colombian 
Administrative Statistics Department). 
14 Instituto Colombiano de Geología y Minas (Colombian Institute of Geology and 
Mining ). 
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Regarding impact on quality of life in municipalities that receive royalties from 
coal improvements these have not been significant or quality of life has even 
become worse. Although coal extraction has paid royalties in Cesar for more 
than 20 years, poverty indicators are worse than for non-producer 
municipalities in the same region and other parts of the country (see graphs 7, 
8 and 9) (Rudas, 2011). Cesar went from receiving US$27 million (2004) to 
US$ 1.3 billion (2011) in royalties from coal mining (Servicio Geológico 
Colombiano, 2012).  Nevertheless 20 of the total 25 municipalities of the 
Department don’t reach the minimum sewage levels required by Colombian 
law and 50% of the municipalities don’t comply with quality parameters for 
water (Bonet, 2007). Infant deaths, unsatisfied basic needs and population 
living in poverty are above the national and departmental averages, concluding 
that the royalties received from coal mining have not produced a significant 
positive impact on poverty indicators (Rudas, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, environmental impacts that are also close related with quality of 
life of the inhabitants are evidently negative. Fourteen percent of the 
department ecosystems have been affected and the remaining 71% of mining 
titles requested would affect another 85% (Acción Social, 2010). Inadequate 
management of wastewaters as in the Manzanares River, groundwater 
affectation causing damages in the most important aquifers of Cesar, deviation 
of rivers from their original course according to the needs of mining 
companies, and coal dust pollution in the air and water have caused several 
additional impacts in soil degradation, deterioration of microclimates, and flora 
and fauna descent15 (Pardo, 2012) (Contraloría General de la República, 2012). 
Fisheries have been also practically destroyed by the deviations of rivers that 
companies run to expand the coal extraction. Calenturitas River, which during 
                                                
15 Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (Institute of 
Hidrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies). 
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the whole 20th century was source of food security for the region, was deviated 
by Glencore through 17 Km, affecting availability of hydro resources and loss 
of a great variety of fish species (Reyes, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Air and water are constantly impacted by spilling of coal dust during the 
transport and transference of the mineral from trucks (1,600 per day), into 
trains (26 per day), then boats and later ships. Efforts by the Ministry of 
Environment (MAVDT) in 2007 to achieve a cleaner production situation have 
only produced slight changes, as shown by the complaints of the Controller’s 
office (Contraloría General de la República, 2012) (Contraloría General de la 
República, 2012b). There is noncompliance in adequate methods for loading 
and downloading of coal, which generates coal dust particle contamination into 
the air, sea, roads, etc. (Contraloría General de la República, 2012b). Immense 
piles of coal that overcome the natural barriers installed at the entrance of the 
mine are dispersed by the wind and deposited finally into vegetation, water 
bodies, animals and the air inhaled by neighbours of the mine, especially 
children and old people. Measurements by the Ministry of the Environment in 
March of 2008 showed how daily counts of suspended air particle 
concentrations exceeded the annual norm for quality in Plan Bonito, la Loma 
and La Jagua de Ibirico, with logical consequences in the population’s health 
and respiratory problems, possibly connected to the high infant mortality rate 
demonstrated in Guillermo Rudas’ study (Rudas, 2012). 
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Rural communities: peasants and settlers 
Besides all the above-mentioned negative impacts on the environment and 
population, there is another fact that is equally disturbing. In the years 
following the granting of the first mining titles in El Cesar, surprisingly regional 
and central authorities did not anticipate any resettlement plan for rural or 
urban communities living in the areas of influence. The only resettlement plan 
for Cesar mining expansion performed until now by governmental authorities 
has been through Resolutions 970 and 1525 of 2010. As said before, 
resettlement was left to the conciliation capacity of mining companies with 
local communities. The result was macabre. The vagueness in Articles 5 and 13 
of Law 685 of 2001 regarding the exact procedure for land expropriation in 
areas of influence in view of the “social interest of mining” resulted in the 
manifestation of a chronic disease suffered by Colombia: violence. 
Numerous allegations from peasant communities of threats, selected 
deaths, kidnappings and disappearances came from Cesar in those years. 
Communities inhabiting territories granted by Ingeominas to Drummond Inc. 
in 1997 (El Descanso Mine with reserves of about 1,700 million tons of coal 
and earth gas) were particularly affected. (See paramilitary declarations in 
Appendix 4.) 
Lands were legalized by bureaucrats connected with political leaders in 
charge of securing the profits of violence performed by armed forces, to be 
sold later to economic powers. Violence and corruption were means to 
dispossess rural communities and accumulate lands for the use of economic 
powers (both local and international). 
Armed actors 
At the beginning of the 1990s, when the coal exploitation was about to start, 
different armed actors fought over control of the central Cesar department 
territory. Guerrillas arrived in the region at the beginning of the 1980s for its  
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strategic location in the middle of two mountain ranges (Sierra Nevada of 
Santa Marta and Perijá Hills), easy places to hide and important mobility and 
interconnection corridors for supplies, but also for guns and drug trafficking 
for outlaw groups (ACNUR (UNHCR), 2008). Guerrilla activities were related 
mainly to kidnapping and extortion of landowners and industrialists, especially 
during the 1980 and 1990 decades (Arcoiris, 2009). 
Paramilitary groups started to form locally in the beginning of the 1990s as a 
response of regional elites to defend their privileges. In 1996 paramilitary 
groups were reinforced in the Cesar department by the entrance of members 
of the AUC16 as part of their process of expansion and consolidation in the 
country in those years (ACNUR (UNHCR), 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Cesar department experienced an intensification of the armed conflict 
and violence especially between the years of 1999 to 2003 as shown in Graphs 
4 and 5, coinciding with mining expansion and the decline of agriculture and 
livestock in the department. As we explained before, in the 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s, guerrillas operated in the centre of the department where the 
most dynamic economies were situated (cattle ranching and industrial 
agriculture), kidnapping and extorting rich landowners. The paramilitaries 
confronted guerrillas in an effort to control territory, displacing most of the 
rural communities affected by the conflict (Arcoiris, 2009). Both guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups have fed their need for material resources from economic 
powers in the regions and both capitalize on the violent control of territories as 
a means to gain access to economic assets. Nevertheless, the nature of the 
                                                
16 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Units). 
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creation of paramilitary groups creates a second characteristic: their access to 
social and political power that comes from their initial financiers, local elites. 
As explained by Jacobo Grajales, violent capital as control of organized 
violence; and social capital as supporting political power and bureaucratic 
networks that allow obtaining influence in administrative decisions support 
paramilitary actions, and so armed violence becomes institutional violence 
when governmental institutions recognize the grabbed land (Grajales, 2011, p. 
772). Coal brings new economic opportunities to perpetuate the conflict and 
redesign the logic of violence in the region. Struggles for the control of the 
strategic assets for mining are part of this dimension where violent power, as 
well as political and social power, interacts to obtain profits from the new 
gains. 
Political power, paramilitary groups and the kiss of death from 
multinationals 
The department of Cesar was created in 1967 with the boom of cotton 
production that brought great wealth for about 25 years to the region. It is not 
difficult to understand the existing powers behind the separation of the former 
“Magdalena Grande” department. Control over resources--apart from the 
centralized power in the capital city of Santa Marta--was the main purpose of 
separation. In the mid-1980s a process of economic stagnation began. Cotton, 
at other times the department’s main income, almost disappeared in the region 
as result of the international markets crash. Most industrial agriculture 
producers left cultivation terrains semi-abandoned. An extensive cattle 
operation that was used as an alternative to reinvest cotton surpluses, became a 
low intensive investment option for facing difficult times (Gamarra, 2005). 
Later, agriculture and cattle ranching diminished from 265,000 hectares in 1990 
to 134,000 in 2002, mainly as a result of violence. In 2005 there were still 1.5 
million heads of livestock registered in the department. (Gamarra, 2005) 
Regarding political power, since its creation the department was related to 
the central political powers, as the first Governor, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, 
was a son of former president Alfonso López Pumarejo (1942-1945) and later 
president during the period 1974-1978. During 1950 and 1960 the Lopez 
family hosted sons of the most important families in the “Magdalena Grande” 
region (Arcoiris, 2009). In the years of the department’s creation the division 
between the Liberal and Conservative parties was merely nominal. Members of 
both hegemonic parties shared the political and economic power in the region 
(Arcoiris, 2009). 
During the 1970s and 1980s these families consolidated their political and 
bureaucratic powers. Meanwhile, the subversive movement spread in the 
department. In those years guerrillas increased pressure over the groups that 
monopolized economic and political power. So, in the middle of the 1990s, 
beset by the massive presence of increasing guerrilla fronts, the department 
witnessed the birth of one of the most important leaders in paramilitary 
groups, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias “Jorge 40.” Born in Valledupar, son of a 
retired army officer member of the department’s elite, Tovar entered the AUC 
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when a General of the Army’s First Division gathered members of Cesar’s 
most renowned families to conform little groups for defence against guerrillas 
(Verdad Abierta, 2008). 
During the expansion of paramilitary groups that began in 1996, alliances 
between the governing class of the department and the paramilitaries 
commanded by Jorge 40 were sealed. The self-defence groups divided the areas 
with electoral potential into sectors and offered to candidates of the 2002 
elections the necessary voter support to be elected (Arcoiris, 2009, p. 60). The 
support materialized in diverse forms, physical violence included. The 
department was divided into three sub-regions: the centre or mining 
municipalities were assigned to Mauricio Pimiento, the south to Alvaro Araujo 
and the north was not assigned, as was declared by Pimiento in his Supreme 
Court trial in 2009 (Arcoiris, 2009, p. 60). 
The paramilitaries didn’t need to enter the electoral game as they already 
had subordinated Cesar’s political elite, thereby accessing the needed political 
power to complete their “criminal machine.” Their power of capital 
accumulation in the displacement and terror of rural communities had the 
veiled purpose of offering political power to the political elites in need of 
support of the population’s voters; no matter if that support resulted from 
terror or their dependency on subsistence means, both politicians and 
paramilitary got their particular purpose. Accumulation of territorial power was 
protected by a project of political supremacy that would offer the paramilitaries 
immunity from national and international justice (Duncan, 2005). The criminal 
pact was sealed in the Cesar department and control over territories, political 
powers and local economies would continue until the demobilization of the 
AUC in 2006. Mining came as a complement to complete their financial 
scheme as can be showed on the testimonies of demobilized paramilitaries. 
(See Appendice 5) 
In this control over territories the growing economy created by coal 
extraction plays a similar role as in the banana zone. Local elites get the most 
benefit by offering political and bureaucratic power to the company as they 
belong to the same hegemonic families and share social and political influences 
in the region. Mining companies associated to local bureaucracies in the search 
of necessary permits to act in the region, offer high positions in the company 
to the elite class. But in this case there is a further ingredient added to the 
control of power in the region: paramilitary groups who offer their “services” 
to gain control over territories. A death alliance is sealed in the middle of an 
incommensurable increase in coal extraction in the department. 
The sad result is that death alliances for resources wealth control are only 
part of the patterns that will continue repeating in the country.  
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5 Connections between findings 
5.1 In-between accumulation and violence 
Is clear that international politics and global economic patterns influenced 
installation of agricultural as well as mining ‘Extraction Enclaves’ in Latin 
American continent, creating a pattern that has been repeated for centuries. 
America was the ‘Eldorado’ (golden treasure), the promised land and the 
disputed territory; but above all was supplier of all needs of the ‘old continent’. 
Colombia as part of imaginary is not the exeption as has been shown on the 
present historical comparative analysis. 
In the cases analysed, prevailing modes of accumulation affected definitely 
the interaction of installed companies that performed the productive processes. 
Control and access over natural resources emerged from preexisting social 
patterns that favored certain modes of violence differently exercised according 
to the historic moment that was happening. 
Violence was cause and effect of the processes above described. It is 
something that can hardly be understood without the complete historic 
recount of the facts. For that purpose the great similarity as well as the 
differences are summarized in the following table that will make a precise 
approach for final asessment of the present research. 
Summary of similarities 
1900 2000 
Patterns and Regimes of accumulation 
• From a simple merchant economy to 
industrial development of a Banana 
enclave. 
• From large scale monocultures 
(cotton, rice, palm oil) and cattle 
ranching to large scale industrial 
mining. 
• Florescence of liberal political and 
economic tendencies which influenced 
the so called Banana Republics in Latin 
American. 
• Maximum expansion of neoliberal 
political-economic model 
influencing various Latin American 
countries. 
• Colombian government creates tax 
exemption for the new establishing 
banana industrial plantations for 20 
years (1909-1929). 
• Colombian government facilitates 
investment of foreign capitals in 
mining sector since 1976 and sealed 
new conditions on the Mining code 
of 2001. 
• Large investments infrastructure 
performed by the company and 
concession granted by the government. 
• Large investments infrastructure 
performed by the company and 
concession granted by the 
government.  
• Land accumulation to expand the 
business. 
• Land accumulation to expand the 
business. 
• Deficiency in boundaries clarification • Deficiency in boundaries 
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between private and public lands. clarification between public, private 
lands as well as protected areas. 
• Property over terrains only clarified 
under pressures of political and 
economic local powers 
• Property over terrains only clarified 
under pressures of political and 
economic local powers supported 
by paramilitary groups and legalized 
by central government authorities. 
• Exponential increase in production and 
exports favored by government. 
• Exponential increase in production 
and exports favored by government. 
• Increase in production meant a great 
migration of newcomers and the uncon-
trolled expansion of agriculture frontier. 
• Increase in production meant the 
depletion of existing agriculture 
zones by contamination resulting of 
coal extraction. 
• Control over resources causes great 
damages on nature: expansion of 
agricultural frontier, deviation of rivers, 
contamination of water sources with 
drained water, large extensions with 
monoculture that at the end caused 
steritily of soils. 
• Control over resources causes great 
damages on nature: deviation of 
rivers, contamination of water, air 
and soils resulting from coal 
transport, depletion of fisheries, 
sterilization of soils, auditive 
contamination, irreversible loss of 
species, human and animal health 
disseases causing death and 
incurable diseases. 
Forms of access and control over resources 
• Land rush is unleashed generating 
tensions at different levels 
• Land rush is unleashed generating 
tensions at different levels 
• Displaced comunities, frictions between 
settlers and the company and between 
large scale producers and small scale 
peasants. 
• Displaced comunities, frictions 
between settlers and the company 
and between large scale producers 
and small scale peasants. 
• Peasants displaced and dispossessed by 
government 
• Peasants displaced by paramilitary 
and dispossessed later by 
government. 
• Companies adapted to existing social 
relations of production and social fields 
of power in their favor. For UFC meant 
interaction with local elites to exercise 
power. 
• Companies adapted to existing 
social relations of production and 
social fields of power in their favor. 
For Drummond was a multiple 
action with local elites and 
paramilitary groups 
• Local elites offered their political power 
to influence central government’s 
policies in favor of UFC that benefited 
the expansion of the company. 
• Company gets political influence of 
political elites, to access to central 
beaurocratic control. Control is 
supported by paramilitary groups 
that help get control of the region. 
• Imbalance in relations of UFC with 
different social groups creates tensions 
and reactions of organized social 
movements. 
• Terror does not favor the 
generation of local reactions and 
organized social movements. 
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• Violations of the existing  labour law. 
Extreme long working hours no social 
security, poor sanitary conditions. 
• Violations of labour law. More than 
4.500 work accidents. Company not 
responding. 
• Force to  is used by Army and Police 
responding to local and central political 
powers suporting UFC. 
• Force is used by private armies at 
the service of political and 
economic powers interested in the 
benefits (financial and 
administrative) of Drummond 
multinational. 
• An undetermined number of deaths 
during the strike of November and 
December 1928 against the UFCo. 
Thousands of peasants forcibly 
displaced from their lands. 
 
• 3 trade union leaders of Drummond 
killed and more than 600 peasants 
assasinated. Thousands more 
peasants displaced and dispossessed 
from their lands where now mine 
and railway are. 
Actors 
• Small scale peasants were mostly 
immigrants to the region atracted by 
possibilities of banana growing. 
• Small scale peasants that resettled in 
vacant or semi-abandoned lands 
after the cotton crisis.  
• Wage labourers were mainly immigrants 
from other partes of the country in 
search of better salaries. 
• Wage labourers mostly came from 
cotton crisis and worked later at the 
mines.  
• Landowners and regional elites with 
political influence at a central level. 
• Landowners and regional elites 
interconnected with paramilitary 
groups and influence on central 
government. 
• Political parties (Conservative, liberal 
and Revolutionary Unitary Party)  
• Conservative, liberal, polo 
democrático and new emerging 
parties in the region (ALAS from 
Araujo family, MIRA cristian 
religious party, Nuevo Partido, 
Colombia Democrática, Colombia 
viva) 
• Caciques and Gamonals that exercice 
political and economic power 
• Caciques and Gamonals that 
exercice political and economic 
power 
• Bureaucrats that keep local power and 
share it with their relatives. 
• Bureaucrats that keep local or 
national power and share it with 
their relatives. 
• Army and Police • Army, Police, Armed groups 
(Guerilla, Paramilitary) 
• Central government /Institutions 
influenced only at certain point by the 
region. 
• Central government/Institutions 
strongly influenced by regional 
political powers. 
• Corporations (United Fruit Co.) • Corporations (Carbones de la Jagua, 
Consorcio Minero Unido, Carbones 
del Tesoro, Sororia - Drummond 
(Cerro Largo), Norcarbón S.A., 
Carbones del Caribe S.A., C.I 
Prodeco/Glencore (Calenturitas and 
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La Jagua), Drummond (La Loma 
and El Descanso), Emcarbón, Vale 
Coal (El Hatillo) and Carbones del 
Cesar (La Francia) 
• Trade unions and unions of peasants in 
the region. 
• Social movements (trade unions, 
oposers of large scale mining, 
defenders of human rights) 
• Media (especially central country’s press) • Media (official and alternative 
media, persecuted journalists and 
renowned columns writers). 
Interconnections between two moments in time are visible. Same patterns are 
repeated, same social relations of production and social fields of power are 
shared. Results are different but intrinsically interconnected. For reasons of 
space they can be found in Appendices 6. Nevertheless we will make further 
analysis trough tree perspectives: solitude, accumulation and violence. 
5.2 Solitude accumulation and violence: factors that explain 
the cause and effect of violence 
Solitude or the process of isolation 
The analyzed natural resource wealthy region was converted into extraction 
enclave since the foundation of the port of Santa Marta in 1525. The territory 
gained importance nationally and internationally only on behalf of a possibility 
of extraction of natural resources. It was abandoned by Spanish at the 
impossibility to find gold nearby. Later the story was repeated when elites of 
the region kept their large properties semi-abandoned during most of the 19th 
century due to lack of opportunities or financial capital for industrial 
agriculture. 
‘Magdalena Grande’ was barely articulated to nation falling behind of 
development for centuries. Its image of ‘wild territory’ with difficult access 
during colonial and republic times, due to exuberant forests and savage 
indigenous communities was one of the reasons for isolation. Territory was as 
inaccessible as described by García Marquez. Population hardly got contact to 
current ‘civilization’ discoveries like ice, as recounted also by people of the 
region at banana times. Only ‘civilization’ that reaches the zone is brought by 
the UFC building infrastructure as part of its own expansive capitalistic project. 
This proof of ‘progress’ is seen by the community as a representation of a state 
that never showed up, but to set policies of extraction and control any 
resistance. As in many states of ‘Global South’ the absence of central 
government’s presence creates a parallel territorial power that nurtures on the 
accumulation of capitals under the mission of a supposed development that 
never comes to the region. 
Later isolation becomes an excuse to keep control over natural resources 
of hegemonic local powers that exploited and benefited from them. UFC 
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becomes ruler and controller of the region. It is helped by political elites and 
bureaucracies that at the end benefited from UFC power. Profit was only for 
few and rest of population had to suffer the harsh conditions of a tropical 
zone, full of diseases and with scarce presence of institutionalism that could 
support their basic needs. The solitude is also complicit of distorted images 
present by Army and Minister of War in the days before massacre of 1928 (See 
Appendices 3).  
Separation of Cesar from ‘Magdalena Grande’ results also in solitude to 
cover the control of financial returns from cotton. The isolation is used later 
by local elites to benefit from coal extraction by benefiting from violent power 
of paramilitary. Isolation is also the mean to keep impunity in the dispossession 
of peasants from their lands, in violent and corrupt methods to protect 
prevailing capital and distance of possibilities of justice.  
Patterns of the beginning of the 20th century have barely changed. 
Isolation keeps the region behind from development for even a longer period 
as in the banana zone. Even results of coal mining are not enough encouraging 
as shows the analysis by Guillermo Rudas; poverty indicators are even worse 
than in non-mining municipalities and departments. Economy of coal mining 
has brought some job to the region, but the effects of communities’ 
displacements and increase in the prices in the region, accompanied by a 
rampant corruption has same effect of other economies of enclave. Now 
departments of Magdalena and Cesar, as the rest of the Caribbean coast as well 
as other mining districts in the continent, are the regions with less access to 
basic infrastructure, higher child mortality and unsatisfied basic needs. Almost 
five centuries after the conquest of these territories the structure of feudal 
power of landlords over peasant population remains similar. 
Isolation is also manifested in the ease of companies to alter nature. The 
absence of institutionalism responsible to keep ecosystems and maintain the 
sustainability of natural resources is causing a complete environmental disaster. 
Environment was left alone and helpless to the immense power of capital. It 
had to face the solitude of self defense of political and economical decisions of 
society. Institutions that were created to protect the interest of natural 
resources were unable to respond to the increasing demand of mining sector 
and are scarcely articulated with mining process. So environment is left alone; 
far away from the speech of Colombian government in international 
environmental summits and conferences. Isolation brings another solitude, the 
one of the dessert in which the region is converted. 
Meanwhile they exercise power by means of violence is only possible as 
result of criminal practices that are not easy to realize for the solitude of the 
grievances of small peasants and workers that are violently dispossessed and 
violently deprived of health and basic leaving conditions. The deadly alliance 
with paramilitary was performed in complicity with solitude and abandonment 
faced by communities in search of development that never arrives. Solitude is 
the curtain used to keep region apart from the world’s sight to perform the 
process of accumulation and the use of violence, leaving it behind from 
development. 
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Accumulation of wealth and power 
As David Harvey says Capital is inevitably expansionary and it is the pattern 
repeated the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta Valley where frontier of nature is 
trespassed further and further transforming a region once wealthy in natural 
resources in an almost deserted zone. Expansion of capitals brought an 
apparent development to a region that at the end practically disappears mired 
in poverty. When UFC left the region after 60 years of capital’s intense 
accumulation the soils were left exhausted by monoculture, the rivers deviated 
and a deep economic crisis was spread all over the region, with a useless 
infrastructure only serving extraction of resources from the region. This 
infrastructure is nevertheless used hundred years later in another process of 
concentration of assets: coal mining. 
Entrance of UFC brought definite changes in the landscapes, land tenure 
and the privatization of large extensions of the territory, but also in the 
dispossession of many peasants and settlers, the loss of lands due to loans of 
the company and an increasing competition over land that only generated 
imbalances. Its sole purpose was the gathering of 60.000 hectares for banana 
production that at the end were invaded by peasant communities for food 
crops. The entrance of coal regime to the region also performed profound 
changes in land tenure and landscapes, by the commoditization of lands and 
forceful expulsion of peasants for the sake of industrial production; by the 
suppression of collective, common and state rights in favor of capital increase 
(Harvey, 2003). It is affecting ecosystems until such a level that at companies 
departure in about 30 years all ecosystems will be destroyed and the production 
of any kind of agriculture will almost be impossible as effect of patterns of 
accumulation of a globalized economy. Continuous industrial agriculture 
regimes that followed the Banana Regime only reinforced the process of 
accumulation of lands and dispossession of peasant communities. So shows 
Colombian GINI coefficient of Colombia, along with Brazil’s and Guatemala 
the highest in the continent: 86 according to a UNDP report in 2011. 
In Banana Empire accumulation led to violence as mean to maintain a 
political and economic power. One hundred years later violence generates 
accumulation or better violence is the preferred method to achieve capital 
accumulation. It is also the pattern followed by political power accumulation. 
In banana times as well as present coal regime pre-existing social, political and 
economic fields of powers are used by multinationals to influence social 
relations of production and to keep the status quo for accumulation. 
Paramilitary accumulation of power was sold to the highest bidder or those 
who could offer better compensations to the ‘military machine’: political or 
economical. So coal multinationals paid for ‘protection’ against an inexistent 
communist enemy with a facade in guerrilla terrorism, but in fact it was paying 
for the possibility to disappear opponents to his ‘accumulative’ control of 
territories and natural resources. Peasants who refuse to sell their lands, trade 
union leaders and academic researchers were killed by the ‘lords of war’ 
(Duncan, 2005) as opponents of an Accumulation Regime, and for the sake of 
these accumulative patterns. 
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Violence: trademark of Colombia’s power relations 
Violence started in Colombia since arrival of colonizers in 1499. Extraction 
patterns arrived from Europe in the ships that departed from America loaded 
of gold, silver and precious stones. Eduardo Galeano in his book Open Veins 
of Latin America describes the constant plundering of natural resources of the 
region by colonial empires and describes the poverty of men as result of wealth 
on earth. This is our constant course and result of hegemonic patterns of 
accumulation. 
Violence is the preferred instrument to perform accumulation in our 
continent: dispossession, imbalance, injustice and inequality are some of the 
expressions. In Colombia the stories here analyzed are reflect of patterns 
intrinsically interconnected with accumulation and violence. Colombian history 
is a story of violent massacres or submissions of Indigenous communities, like 
the case of Casa Arana in the production of gum at the Amazon. It is also the 
story of Spanish prisoners and African slaves brought for forced labour for 
capital accumulation in mining and agriculture industries in the colonial times. 
Ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta, some of the principal ports of Spain 
during the colony, suffered repeated attacks (from English and Dutch pirates) 
to control wealth extracted from the continent. 
Violence was also inflicted upon cultures and religions to erase any trace 
of local beliefs imposing Christianity as supreme belief. Cultural practices were 
destroyed and races were despised prevailing white race as the only capable of 
controlling power in the country. White men ruled so over indigenous, over 
African descendents and over mixed races. Even now people suspects of 
strangers or newcomers; at least of non-members of their own race, social 
group or political party. At UFC times: white conservative elites rejected 
newcomers ‘mestizos’ belonging to Liberal Party. Also Army acted against a 
communist enemy represented in wage labourers and peasant who claimed for 
their rights (a different way of thinking). The same happens at the control of 
the coal zone, where the peasants and trade union leaders are again equalled to 
supporters of guerrilla and terrorist to justify violent actions. 
Finally violence is reproduced in nature as a constant transformation by the 
accumulative patterns. Gold, silver, emeralds, then oil, coal, later coltan and 
again gold are being extracted from Colombia. The same process was 
experienced in Perú, Bolivia, Chile or Ecuador, as well as Indonesia, Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria and Congo. Regions once wealthy in natural resources are 
elevated to the category of ‘Extraction Enclaves’ to be ‘rescued from 
underdevelopment’ and ‘eradicate poverty’. In the region analyzed, one 
hundred years later the region is almost depleted and the same misery looms at 
every corner. Waters, soils and air are contaminated, agricultural frontier is 
expanded and accumulative patterns now threaten remaining ‘protected areas’ 
of the region (Isla Salamanca, Parque Tayrona, Sierra Nevada) to disappear. 
Violence is manifested in the absence of the state to supervise the social 
welfare and preserve natural capital of the regions. It is also manifested in the 
prevalence of corruption in the legalization of lands to impostor claimants at 
the paramilitary forces service. 
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“Facing this awesome reality that throughout 
human time must have seemed a utopia, as 
inventors of tales who will believe anything, we 
feel entitled to believe that it's not too late to 
begin the creation of the opposite utopia. A new 
and sweeping utopia of life, where no one can 
decide for others even how they die, where love 
will prove true and happiness be possible, and 
where the races condemned to one hundred 
years of solitude will have, at last and forever, a 
second opportunity on earth.”
Gabriel García Márquez
Violence is finally manifested in imbalance and injustice in the control 
over natural resources. Accumulation patterns prevail in the regions and power 
control over resources is more and more influenced by violence. In Banana 
Regime accumulation of capital and resources of UFC and elites led to violence 
by the efforts to maintain control of them. In Coal Regime violence led to 
accumulation, as manifestation of power of paramilitary to negotiate the 
territories with political and economic elites to get political and economic 
control and also for accumulation. In this second case is a pattern of 
accumulation for accumulation (of force, of lands, of political power, of 
capital, of resources control) and the mean used is violence. 
6   Conclusions 
Escobar’s critique to Bruntland’s understanding of Sustainable Development 
says that nature is reinvented as environment and it is capital, not nature or 
culture that is made sustainable (Escobar, 1996). A fallacy is created. 
Sustainability of nature is by this reasoning only possible in the perfect 
allocation of natural resources to reduce poverty. 
This pattern of different discourse was followed many times by Latin 
America in depleting nature and ravaging culture. The result of alleviating 
poverty is not reached; instead patterns of accumulation of capital keep 
inflicting deep scars on the continent. Regions are being condemned to be 
developed by a system that is only bringing resources out but for many reasons 
not giving back any alleviation to the problem of poverty. 
In the region analyzed the purpose of development was not reached 
either. Instead, a maddening game is repeated all over again. Accumulation 
leads to violence and violence leads to new accumulation. Both are closely 
linked. Accumulation is maintained by violence in the Banana Empire.  
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Violence helps the purpose of accumulation in the Coal Empire. The fuel that 
keeps the wheel turning is power and control over natural resources. The 
wheel has been turning round and round since colonial times, and it is our duty 
as development connoisseurs to think about alternatives to bring a full stop to 
this wheel. 
Gabriel García Márquez recounted in his acceptance speech for the Nobel 
Prize in 1982 the extraordinary nature and unbelievable reality of Latin 
America that fuelled hallucinatory stories of the first conquerors. The 
mesmerized mind of the visitors raved for the stories of gold, precious stones, 
eternal youth and a haunting richness offered by this paradise called America. 
Delirium was replaced by greed, and avarice morphed into violence. It is a 
violence that has followed its inhabitants from Mexico to Patagonia, covering 
territories with war, blood, terror, refugees and grievances for oppression, 
looting and neglect of our peoples.  
What is the hope of other regions in Colombia equally destined for 
“development,” like the Pacific Coast, the Central Region, or the Amazon? Is 
sustainable mining really possible as announced by present President Juan 
Manuel Santos during his intervention in Rio+20? A zone once wealthy in 
natural resources is almost turning into a lunar desert. What is the destiny of 
the departments of Vichada, Guainía and Vaupés (which are part of the 
Colombian Amazon), where large-scale mining concessions are being analyzed 
for “development”? One can imagine the result by seeing the impact of control 
processes over natural resources and accumulation patterns followed in the 
“Magdalena Grande.” Forests have to be torn down, and almost all 
biodiversity will be ravaged; roads and railways will be built impeding survival 
of ecosystems; rivers will be altered and diverted from their course, losing 
fisheries and livelihoods of indigenous communities; waters will be 
contaminated by production of mining and transport processes; and finally the 
region will be condemned again to the eternal solitude and persistent injustice 
in the Latin American continent. Desertification, corruption, power relations 
and violence are the only survivors of accumulation. 
Violence is a cause and an effect of accumulation and the pre-existent 
social fields of power are accountable for the unfair responses of violent 
actors, more than a scarcity or abundance of natural resources. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Many workers were affected by malaria, yellow fever and dysentery and it was 
calculated that almost 5% died from these and other tropic diseases. Port 
loaders had to wait sometimes 24 hours without sleeping for the next ship to 
be loaded and plantation workers had to receive only seasonal payment with 
no Sunday or holiday payment (White, 1978, p. 50).  
Appendix 2  
The case of ‘Las Flores’ in 1927 (White, 1978, p. 62) that was reflected in local 
and national newspapers as: ‘United Fruit operates in areas of the nation to 
grab them’17. Thus the ‘Vacant Lands’ Comission’ started an investigation that 
resulted in the complaint mentioned in the previous section of 32.000 hectares 
of the nation in hands of the UFC. 
 
Appendix 3 
What were the facts behind this event? How could governmental authorities 
commit such disproportioned force act?  
‘Memory is just the representation of the past events. …Always past will be 
remembered with attributing meaning of what happened; even principal 
protagonists of the facts will remember the events from the eyes of their own 
interests that reflect their position in the contradictory account of the facts’ 
(Archila, 2008, p. 147). 
 Is complicated to understand what exactly led to the direct violence in this 
case, mostly when the country’s memory tries always to consider the facts as a 
fiction constructed for literary purposes by García Marquez. 
Demands asked by the worker’s trade union were simply compliance of 
Colombian Labor Law18. It was not a call for a socialist revolution or the 
overthrow of the government as some groups pretended later. The first 
impressions of local authorities demonstrated the legal and peaceful nature of 
the strike. It was the UFC which declared the illegality of the strike, sending a 
telegram to the President adducing the imminent danger of a ‘mutiny’ (White, 
1978, p. 91) Although the Ministry of Industries and the Trade Union settled a 
previous agreement on the three first points of the list of demands, the 
company refused to sign and even to accept the mediation of the Governor or 
even General Cortés Vargas, designed by the Ministry of War to control the 
strike (White, 1978) (Archila, 2008).  
                                                
17 El Tiempo newspaper, January 19, 1928. 
18 The list of demands of the workers of the UFC included 9 points: 1. setting of collective insurance 2. 
Protection for work accidents 3.Compliance with national laws on labour rooms, social hygiene and 
public assistance and remunerated dominical rest.4.50% Raise in salaries 5.Suppression of the 
Commissariat Stores and free trade in the zone 6.Elimination of loans trough vouchers 7.Weekly 
payments 8.Setting of collective contracts 9.Hospitals per 400 workers and one doctor per 200 workers. 
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Ministry of Industries was withdrawn from the strike management and the 
Ministry of War assumed the mission; at that moment information vision 
started to come from the military side (Archila, 2008). This had an implication 
hence the Minister of War, Ignacio Rengifo, alerted this year repeatedly to 
President Miguel Abadía Méndez (1926-1930) that the Communist Bolshevik 
revolution had the intention to take the power of Colombia. It was unleashed a 
persecution against everything that meant left in the country and the ‘Heroic 
Law’ was settled to silence every information attempt from the left party. 
Americans shared that same perspective as they had experienced in their 
country a similar wave of persecutions against possible communists and 
anarchist in 1919 and 1920 called the ‘Red Terror’ (Viloria, 2009) and so 
American newspaper like the New York Times spoke on December 6, 1928 
about a ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ instead of a strike demanding labor rights in the 
Banana Zone of Magdalena (Archila, 2008, p. 161). 
For Minister Rengifo and General Cortés Vargas insurrection of workers 
and aggressive reaction of the strikers was a reality. Although General Cortés 
Vargas recognizes in a communication days before the massacre that the 
strikers ‘didn’t have intention to attack’, Minister Rengifo continues to release 
news about the railway blockades, assaults on UFC buildings, sabotage to 
telephone and telegraph lines and armed skirmishes, even denominating 
‘guerrilla’ to the strikers in a clear form of constructing an enemy assigning it a 
more violent character than what it had (Archila, 2008, p. 161). It is sadly sort 
of what happens today in Colombia that every claim of rights of the deprived 
population (indigenous peoples, small scale peasants, displaced communities) 
are denominated ‘guerrilla’ by the government building a created enemy’s 
image as will show later some of the testimonies of the paramilitary leaders. 
Nevertheless communications of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and other 
left movements revealed that later was considered a possible insurrection. But 
at the beginning the demonstration was a simple attempt to claim for Labor 
Rights, so the ‘machetes’ used were for self-defense of. Main line of action was 
a civil resistance and not an armed uprising or guerrilla warfare like the 
Ministry of War tried to show (Archila, 2008, p. 158). But the perceived by 
Cortés and Rengifo most dangerous angle was not that the protesters were 
armed, but the sympathy and fellowship that they managed with the troops 
designated to the zone. For General Cortés Vargas demonstrators didn’t 
‘recognize authority’ and therefore soldiers would not be respected as 
representatives of control of the country (Archila, 2008, p. 162).  
An additional ingredient was added to threaten of both sides: government 
and strikers. Information of a possible invasion of the United States to protect 
their citizens and the specter of the previous struggle for Panama, put both 
sides under alert. So would be told later by Cortés Vargas in his book and by 
Jorge Eliecer Gaitán19 in his defense on the congress of the prisoners of the 
massacre in 1929 (Gaitán, 1988). 
                                                
19 Leader of the deprived groups and defender of the prisoners of the massacre; 
Liberal who became the outstanding Colombian populist, a leading protagonist in the politics of the 
country (Posada-Carbó, 1998, p. 400); killed in 1948.  
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The night of the massacre the multitude was expecting the visit of the 
Governor who never appeared, so the men, women and even children standing 
that night at the Cienaga square were not at all ready for an armed 
confrontation with some ‘machetes’ that they brought ready only to speak with 
the authorities (White, 1978, p. 97). 
What happened later were different versions that where shortened or 
extended according to the side that they were coming. The first information of 
the Ministry of War spoke about eight dead persons. With the time the figures 
changed. Versions of the American Ambassador Caffrey reported 100 deaths 
initially and then between 500 and 600. Later representatives of the Socialist 
Party would elevate the deaths to 1004 and the wounded more than 3.000. 
They sustained that the troops had followed those fleeing and killed them, 
throwing the bodies to the sea (Archila, 2008). In any case what followed here 
could be what Posada-Carbó denominates in his article ‘Conspiracy of Silence 
(Posada-Carbó, 1998)’, an attempt to erase from the memory the horror of the 
facts (Archila, 2008). 
What is more surprising is the impunity that followed. Although the 
imprisoned were released after the defense performed on the Congress by 
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in September 1929 (Gaitán, 1988), the army was never 
prosecuted by the crimes and General Cortés Várgas was promoted by 
Minister Ignacio Rengifo. United Fruit Company continued the accumulation 
process in the region, though with less intensity not because of the demands of 
the workers not satisfied after the night of the massacre, but because the 
conditions dictated by the ‘invisible hand’ of the international markets. They 
left the region in the 1960s to install in another extraction enclave: the 
Antioquian Uraba. Magdalena region was plunged into a deep economic crisis 
in the 1960s, in which most of the lands were left abandoned and invaded in 
the following years by new settlers. Agriculture frontier was expanded in the 
30s, 40s and 50s more and more to the south of ‘Magdalena Grande’ where 
new plantations of rice and cotton were established. In the 1960 a new boom 
was generated causing political and economic powers to declare separation 
from the Magdalena Grande department. Three new departments were created 
in 1967: Magdalena, Cesar and La Guajira. 
 
Appendix 4 
As an example community of Michoacán, settlers who came from other 
regions at the middle of the 1990s searching for possibilities of livelihoods for 
their families were object of threats between 1999 and 2003. Selective killings 
were suffered by leaders of the community that refused to abandon their lands 
received from the government in 1997 as process of land reform. 
Displacement of the rest of the community occurred in 2004. The ownership 
of their lands was reversed by Incoder in 2007 alleging abandonment of the 
settlers. Some other parcels apparently were sold with false property 
conveyances as shows the signature of some of the peasants after their own 
death (Verdad Abierta, 2010).  
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These facts can be connected with the declaration of Alcides Mattos 
Tabares, Alias El Samario, one of the leaders of the North Block of the AUC 
after his trial in the process of Justice and Peace in November 2009. 
"All this (displacement) is performed for the lands, which are rich in coal, 
this generates a lot of money, from there comes all this displacement. A 
conflicting land is worthless, where there are dead, displaced, one could buy a 
hectare of land for $150.000 pesos" (Verdad Abierta, 2010). 
Appendix 5 
Declaration of Libardo Duarte, alias BamBam, declared in an interview in 
January 2012 that was later presented to courts in Alabama, United States, that 
Drummond was paying his group of paramilitaries for “security.” He also 
affirmed that peasants who refused to sell their land were murdered. Now the 
area is crossed by a new railway constructed by the company. Duarte specified 
that he met repeatedly with senior officials of the company like Mike Tracy 
(now responsible for mining operations, engineering, mineral property 
development, oil and gas development, and other administrative functions 
(Drummond Ltd. Colombia, 2012), Alfredo Araujo (Manager of Community 
Relations) and Jaime Blanco Maya, who would act as intermediary for 
payments (Verdad Abierta, 2012). 
Appendix 6 
Summary of interconnections 
From International to National  
Patterns and Regimes of Accumulation 
1. International politics influenced installation of Banana and Coal regimes. 
In both cases particular economic interests in the local predisposed 
Colombian politics to act in favor of multinational companies. 
Nevertheless in the present mining process is undeniable the influence of 
multilateral organizations in the structural changes performed in economic 
policies to favor large scale mining investment. 
2. Policies to encourage foreign investment were established with a promise 
for development of the region and the country in the long run. In the case 
of Banana Empire the promise was never fulfilled. In the case of coal 
mining 20 years after starting the results are worse conditions for  
3. In both cases generalized economical crisis in the country is taken as main 
justification to start structural process of change the establishment of 
extraction enclaves. 
4. In both cases the crisis was followed by an authoritatian president that 
extended his government period. 
5. In both cases companies got the control of transport infrastructure 
especially railway and ports of the region. Although during the Banana 
regime the train was used not only to extract the product from the region 
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but to bring multiple benefits to the people of the region, now 
infrastructure of ports and railway service are only for the mining 
extraction companies. Locals only receive the consequences of 
environmental deterioration resulting from the mineral transport. 
 
From National to regional and Viceversa 
Forms of Access and Control over resources 
6. In both cases consequences of displacement were never contemplated by 
government, which never planned a resettlement process. 
7. Tensions were handled differently at each time. At the banana zone 
settlers were evicted by the action of the police in the coal zone settlers 
were displaced by force of paramilitary actions. 
8. The increase in production is accompanied with increase in discontent of 
inhabitants of the region. 
9. The lack of boundaries clarification was used by power groups to capture 
large extensions of land. Hundred years after the banana empire the rural 
boundaries, and borders to protected areas are still unclear favoring the 
dispossession of rural communities. 
10. In both cases exercise of power was managed conveniently by 
multinational for the land appropriation as well as for control of the 
means of production. Government acted in an absent way by not 
protecting population entitlements for land, health, healthy environment 
11. In both cases the companies adapted to existing social relations of 
production and social fields of power in their favor.  
12. The imbalance in relations created by the UFC generated reactions of the 
deprived groups: liberal party medium scale producers, small scale 
peasants and workers. The company took advantage of this to divide the 
groups and maintain the power. 
 
Actors involved that prevail over the years 
Regional Elites 
Families belonging to the traditional elite of the region controlled the arable 
lands and means of production of the region of Magdalena since the 
colonization of this region and managed to influence the politics of the central 
government that could benefit them.  
This has been a pattern in many regions of Colombia. Local large scale 
landowners associated with the international or national investors offering 
them political influence with the central government. In turn, the multinational 
companies would favor them by buying their lands to higher prices than the 
regional markets to have capacity of negotiation and pressure to the local or 
national government (Viloria, 2009, p. 26). That is exactly the same pattern 
followed today by the extractive multinationals present in the country. 
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United Fruit Company 
A local business converts into a regional empire that affected life of thousands 
of workers and banana growers in a dozen of Latin American countries. It has 
symbolized for years the rise and expansion of a capital empire in raw materials 
producing countries. 
Governmental authorities 
 
Central government 
The most important president periods analyzed here are from Rafael Reyes 
(1904-1909) and Miguel Abadía Méndez (1926-1930) who set two important 
moments in the banana expansion: the governmental support for international 
investment of Reyes, and the violent response to the strike of 1928 by Abadía 
Méndez. 
For some, the President Rafael Reyes used his land allocation policy as a 
strategy of political patronage to benefit some of his former comrades in arms 
of the Thousand Days’ War and personal friends (Viloria, 2009, pp. 32-33). So 
he was personally benefited by the banana expansion as show the investments 
performed by a company from which he was one of the partners (Viloria, 
2009).  
Under President Abadía Méndez was unleashed a persecution of the left 
party by the ‘Heroic Law’. His strong response to the Banana Strike weakened 
not only his power but also the power of the conservative party ruling the state 
for thirty years. 
 
Regional Authorities 
Is important to underline how political power was in the hands of the same 
families that had the economical power in the region. This fact made them be 
able to create a joint venture that benefited them in the business and the UFC 
in obtaining necessary favors of the local and regional authorities. These 
authorities also suppose the ‘Caciques and Gamonales’ described by Jorge 
Orlando Melo in his article ‘Caciques y gamonales: Perfil político’ where he 
describe ‘the rich men of little regions, owner of the most valuable lands, who 
dominates without rival the political sphere of the region corrupting and 
distorting the citizens participation in electoral matters’ (Melo, 1988). This local 
power had extreme importance for the national political power in the moment 
of elections, so for the national politicians has been tradition to concede favors 
in exchange for the political support of the region.  
 
